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FOREWORD 
This module constitutes an integral part of the Main Comparative Report of the 
Science and Technology Policy Instruments (STPI) project, a large research effort that 
examines the design and implementation of science and technology policies in 10 develop-
ing countries (Appendixes l and 2). 
The STPI project generated a large number of reports, essays, and monographs 
covering a great variety of themes in science and technology for development. More than 
250 documents were produced by the country teams and the Field Coordinator's Office, 
and this proliferation posed rather difficult problems during the comparative phase of 
the project. It was decided that a Main Comparative Report, covering the substantive 
aspects of the research work of the country teams would be published, and that several 
monographs treating specific subjects would complement it. 
The Main Comparative Report is organized in three parts. The first consists 
of a short essay covering the main policy and research issues identified through the 
research, and the second contains the most relevant results of a comparative nature that 
were obtained in the project. These first two parts have been published by the Inter-
national Development Research Centre in a single volume in English, Spanish, and French 
(l09e, 109s, and 109f). 
The third part of the Main Comparative Report consists of 12 modules containing 
material selected from the many reports produced during the STPI project. They provide 
the supporting material for the findings described and the assertions made in the first 
two parts of the Main Comparative Report. 
The modules were prepared by several consultants, and given the diversity of 
topics covered, the IDRC staff did not consider it desirable nor possible to impose a 
single format or structure for their preparation. The reader will find a diversity of 
styles and structures in the modules and will find that the selection of texts reflects 
the views of the consultant who compiled the module. However, the modules were prepared 
in close collaboration with the Field Coordinator and were also submitted to a STPI 
editorial committee who ensured that they provided a representative sample of STPI 
material. They should be read in conjunction with the first two parts of the Main 
Comparative R~port. 
Francisco R. Sagasti 
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INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this nxldule is to examine different approaches to the study of 
the interrelations between science, technology, development, industrialization, and 
technical change to provide a theoretical background to the efforts of the STPI project. 
During both the organization of the project and the conduct of the research, the 
approaches and points of view of different authors were extensively discussed by the 
members of the STPI network. From the study of these schools of thought and from 
dissatisfaction with the current state of knowledge, it became clear that additional 
empirical research was needed to postulate more adequate theories of development that 
would include explicitly scientific and technological considerations. 
The STPI project did not postulate a particular theory from which to derive 
hypotheses on the emergence and effectiveness of policy instruments for science and 
technology. Therefore, this review complements the findings summarized in other modules 
in this series and in the other reports prepared as a result of the STPI project. The 
schools of thought, points of view, and theories examined below were discussed 
continually by the members of the STPI network throughout the project, although the 
decision to prepare a review essay was only taken toward the end of the project, at the 
New Delhi meeting of the Coordinating Committee in January 1976. 
The interaction between socioeconomic processes and science and technology is 
discussed next, followed by sections on the different approaches to the study of 
technology, industrialization, and development. These include neoclassical theory 
and its ramifications regarding production, trade, innovation, and the problem of 
factor proportions; the historical perspective of Rostow's stages of growth theory; 
the structuralist view of the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA); the 
dependency school of thought; the developments in oligopoly theory; and the Marxist 
theories of capital accumulation at the international level. 
A discussion of the nature of technical change at the enterprise level follows 
the review of the different development theories and their technological implications. 
The literature on this subject is varied and extensive, although it refers primarily 
to technical change in enterprises of advanced industrialized countries. The discussion 
is complemented by observations about the nature of technical change in developing 
countries. The nxldule closes with some remarks on the policy implications of the 
different schools of thought and mentions some studies in the area of policy 
implementation. 
Before entering into the subject matter, a few comments on the interplay between 
socioeconomic forces and technical progress are in order. The structure and logic of 
the system of production provide the context for the evolution of technology and, in 
consequence, technological progress cannot be examined independently of the social 
forces that led to it and allowed its materialization and subsequent incorporation 
into productive and social activities. This view can be adopted as a way of describing 
historically observed processes (1), but it can also be taken in a normative sense, with 
a new style of development and a new logic of production leading to a new style and 
logic of technological progress (2). 
However, there is also a strong feedback from the processes of scientific and 
technical development to the evolution of socioeconomic forces, which takes the form of 
removing constraints and creating new opportunities. The progress of science and 
technology is continually altering the characteristics of the productive system, both 
in capitalist and socialist economies (3), and it is impossible to ignore the fact that 
the emergence of organized industrial research and the rise of science-related 
technology (4) have been decisive in opening new avenues for capital accumulation 
and in fueling the process of industrial growth. Nevertheless, this does not imply 
accepting the "technological imperative which states that what is technically feasible 
will actually be done (for better or worse), for there is evidence that technical 
developments, at least in Western market economies, are usually subordinated to the 
interests of those who control the generation of knowledge and its application to 
production (enterprises and entrepreneurs), such that in some cases new technologies 
may be supressed to avoid potential disruption of the existing order (5). 
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Summarizing: the logic of production and the evolution of productive forces 
set the stage for the emergence of technical developments and determine the use that will 
be made of them. In turn, technological progress removes constraints,·and provides the 
productive system with opportunities to expand. While accepting a strong two-way 
interaction in the interplay between the development of productive forces and of science 
and technology, the main role seems to be with the former. 
An important distinction that should be kept in mind is that made between the 
"use value" and the "exchange value" of technology. This requires that technology be 
conceptualized as a commodity or merchandise, which is adequate from the perspective 
of production, trade, and utilization of industrial technology taken in this report 
(it is, however, insufficient when broader social, educational, and cultural aspects 
of the impact of technology are examined). This distinction has been drawn recently 
by Gonad (6) and by Sercovich (7), who point out that from the point of view of use 
value, technology can be considered as the compound of applied knowledge instrumental 
to the production, management, marketing, and distribution of goods and services. 
Technology as a use value emphasizes the intrinsic characteristics of a particular body 
of knowledge and the ways in which it can be employed. Most of the theoretical literature 
on the interrelations between technology and development treats technology from this 
perspective. 
From an exchange value point of view, technology can be considered as a 
privately appropriated asset conveying market power. As such it has the potential 
capacity to earn monopoly rents for those who control and exploit it. This introduces 
the perspective of power relations and the way in which technology is appropriated as a 
means of extracting surplus from those who need to aquire it through trade. The use 
value of technology is not manifested through the exchange process and the price 
associated with the transaction. 
In the first conception, within certain limits, technology can be considered 
largely universal in the sense that its usefulness transcends particular forms of social 
organization (8). However, in the second conception, it is peculiar - but not exclusive -
to the capitalist economy and aquires its most conspicuous form of development as a 
commodity in the oligopolistic stage of market organization. Proprietary knowledge, 
irrespective of how useful it may be for various people in different places, has a 
market price. Therefore, the access to a technique, and hence its use value to those 
who need it, is conditioned by its exchange value and the associated market price, 
which in turn is determined by the relative bargaining power of the buyer and the 
seller (9). Finally, the relative bargaining power (and hence the market price 
associated with the exchange value of a technology) will be determined by the structure 
of productive forces and the overall form of social organization. 
NEOCLASSICAL THEORY 
The neoclassical school is the product of more than one hundred years of work by 
economists and has been able to establish a highly coherent and formally rigorous 
theoretical framework to which its followers attribute an almost universal validity. 
Stemming from the utilitarian thinking of the 19th century, the analysis is centred on 
the static model of "pure and perfect" competition and on the internal equilibrium and 
coherence of the spheres of production and consumption as the desideratum of the 
analytical proposals. 
To see how neoclassical theory has led to various ways of dealing with technical 
progress, reference will be made to production functions, international trade, 
Schumpeter's theory of innovations, and the problem of factor proportions. 
Production and Technical Progress Functions (10) 
The changes in production levels brought about by technical progress incorporated 
into productive activities through machinery and human resources are analyzed using the 
concept of the "production function. 11 A production function expresses the re 1 a ti on 
between the maximum amount of output and the inputs (primarily capital and labour) 
required to produce it; by doing so it describes the manner in which inputs combine 
with each other in varying proportions to produce any given output. The production 
function enters economic analysis as a datum given by technological or extraeconomic 
considerations, and the technology embedded in the production relation acts as a 
constraint on decision making. 
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The production function embodies an abstract technology. Its generality 
derives from the fact that it abstracts from certain technical and economic magnitudes 
and in doing so enables a variety of economic problems to be analyzed and different types 
of technological change to be described. An abstract technology is characterized by its 
efficiency, which determines the output that results from given inputs; by the 
technologically determined economies of scale, which describe the extent to which a 
proportionate change in inputs generates a proportionate change in output; by the 
capital intensity, which denotes the specific weight placed on capital as compared with 
labour inputs; and by the ease with which capital is substituted for labour, that is, 
the elasticity of substitution (11). 
Production functions have been used by economists in the neoclassical tradition 
to describe behaviour at the productive unit level and, using aggregate production 
functions, at the sectoral and national levels. However, the construction of aggregate 
production functions is fraught with difficulties that require the introduction of many 
simplifying assumptions. These diminish considerably their possible usefulness for the 
analysis of real economic phenomena. Furthermore, the problems of defining and 
measuring the capital and labour inputs to relate them to output have given rise to a 
variety of theoretical and practical discussions and controversies (12). 
It was only in the late l950's and the l960's that economists turned their 
attention to the explicit introduction of technological considerations within the 
framework of neoclassical production function theory (13). The rather restrictive 
set of conditions and assumptions required to operate within the framework of production 
functions has not allowed much progress in this direction. Most studies have tried to 
explain the nature and magnitude of the "residual," introducing more refined ways of 
breaking it up. The initial conception was that this residual, or unexplained difference 
between the output growth and the proportion of this growth supposedly attributable to 
capital and labour increases, was due to exogenous technical progress which depended on 
factors that could not be incorporated into the model. Furthermore, technical progress, 
conceived as a residual factor, was initially thought of as "neutral" in the sense that 
it was assumed that it did not affect the capital/labour ratio (14). Subsequent 
formulations of the production functions, and in particular the introduction of constant 
elasticity of substitution {CES) production functions, allowed the model to approximate 
reality (represented by statistical history) more closely (15). 
Another set of developments in this direction emphasized the importance of 
technical progress embodied in capital - the embodiment hypothesis - differentiating 
among the various vintages of machinery that incorporate different levels of technical 
progress. The hypothesis was that if new technical knowledge can only be embodied in 
capital goods, then more recent additions to the capital stock must be weighted more 
heavily than earlier additions, which has the effect of increasing the sensitivity of 
output growth to changes in the capital stock. Hence, investment becomes the main 
vehicle for technical progress (16). However, investment acts on the absolute level 
of technology and not on the rate of technical change, which is still considered an 
exogenous variable not directly linked to previous investments or to capital formation. 
In fact, these attempts represent a semiendogenous force of technical progress. 
It is interesting to explore some of the implications of the embodiment 
hypothesis, particularly the contradictory relationships that emerge between technical 
progress and the rate of obsolescence. The greater the speed of introduction of new 
machinery, the greater the growth of output. The rate of depreciation affects the 
speed of introduction of new machinery, thus reducing production costs and raising 
average productivity, although it also results in the relative economic disappearance 
of old machines, thereby decreasing the stock of capital. The resulting effect will 
depend on the relative velocity of these two phenomena, which would also provide a 
rationale for accelerating the speed of obsolescence and transferring relatively 
obsolete machinery to other areas, such as the developing regions. 
Other ramifications of the production function theory attempt to explain the 
origin of the rate of technical progress using the "induced" technical progress 
models {17). The assumption here is that the economic life of equipment comes to its 
end when the per capita productivity of old machines becomes lower than the wage rate, 
for wages increase jointly with the introduction of new and more efficient equipment. 
This assumption implies that the economic life of certain production equipment would 
be lengthened by transferring it to low-salary locations, such as developing countries. 
It is also stated that technological knowledge is acquired training and a function of 
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the production level achieved within the particular working environment. The 
significant issue in these studies is that in attempting to explain the origin of 
technical progress the analysis takes into account the problems of generating technical 
improvements in addition to discussing their impact. They examine not only total 
investment but also its composition, for some types of investment (such as R&O) 
accelerate technical progress more than others. 
The key ideas that can be drawn from the theory of induced technical progress 
and related developments can be summarized as follows (18): 
(1) All technology is dated and localized; its degree of optimality depends 
on the specific environment in which it is used. 
(2) The key problem is the production or generation of techniques and not so 
much their use (importation, transfer, assimilation, and adaptation). 
(3) The generation of techniques depends on the level and the structure of the 
general productive activity of the system. 
(4) The growth of output depends on the speed of technological innovation, 
which, in turn, is fed by a higher rate of equipment depreciation. 
Another attempt at dealing with the impact of technical progress on production 
consisted of the explicit introduction of the inventive process through the use of the 
"invention possibility" function, which is made part of the conventional production 
function (19). The invention possibility function, which denotes the effect of research 
on the productivity of capital and labour, is supposed to be multiplicative (and hence 
neutral) in increasing productivity. The introduction of this new function permits the 
theoretical analysis of optimum levels of investments in research, but it does not 
succeed in making production function theory any more useful for policy purposes. 
International Trade and Technical Progress 
The main ideas on international trade that were put forward by the neoclassical 
school are strongly related to the expansion of the capitalist system of production at 
the world level and the corresponding insertion of the less developed countries into the 
international division of labour. Starting from the classical theory of international 
trade developed by Ricardo and improved by Mill, subsequent theorists became concerned 
about the reasons for the existence of comparative advantages in a world where the 
initial suppositions of the classics (climate and other advantages due to the physical 
environment) have been superseded by the transition from predominantly agricultural 
economies to industrial ones. Heckscher (20) and Ohlin (21) provided a model of 
international trade where it was assumed that the same technology is available all over 
the world and that there are no technologically derived economies of scale, meaning that 
production technology could be made to operate with the same efficiency for any scale of 
output. Given that different industries require capital and labour in different 
proportions, those countries with large amounts of labour relative to capital will tend 
to specialize in labour-intensive goods, while countries where capital is relatively 
more abundant will do the opposite. International trade will arise and a mutually 
profitable exchange of labour-intensive for capital-intensive goods will take place. 
This implies that the relative endowments of capital and labour will determine the 
direction and nature of trade. Samuelson (22) subsequently added his theorem on factor 
price equalization to this theory. 
It has been pointed out that "the assumptions of the Heckscher-Ohlin model are 
designed to eliminate the possibility of trade occurring due to technological 
differences between countries, in the form either of inherent differences in technology 
or of differences associated with varying capacities of countries to exploit a commonly 
available technology" (23). This assumption may have been valid in the relatively 
simple industrial world of the last century when production techniques were simpler 
and easier to master, but it is clearly inadequate at present. 
The possession of superior production technology and highly developed 
technological capabilities constitutes an additional source of comparative advantages 
above and beyond those conferred by the physical environment and by the relative 
endowment of capital and labour resources. Posner (24) proposed a model that 
incorporated technologically derived advantages into a dynamic theory of international 
trade, demonstrating how technological innovation could create a comparative advantage 
that had not previously existed. He also postulated that the initial advantage thus 
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obtained would gradually be eroded by the spread of the new technique through imitation. 
This theory was refined by Hufbauer (25) and other economists in Britain who 
differentiated between trade arising out of technological advantages and out of 
relative factor costs. 
However, according to Johnson (26), "the theory suffered from an absence of 
explanation of why technological innovations occur in some countries rather than in 
others. The explanation was left at the level of an unexplained decision to invest 
resources in research." 
The "product cycle" theory of Vernon (27) sought to provide answers to the 
questions of why an innovation emerges in one country and why it is gradually transferred 
to other countries. According to Vernon, because the innovator has an initial monopoly 
and because the demand for the new product is likely to be relatively inelastic, the 
cost of production will not initially be a major factor, and hence he can afford to 
invest in its development. Also, the development of a new product requires a close 
interaction between the innovating enterprises and the suppliers of production equipment 
and machinery. For these reasons, an innovation will take place in the country for 
whose market it is designed and not elsewhere. 
After the introduction of a new product, it will be exported to other countries 
where a market exists for it, giving rise to a "technological gap" trade. However, as 
demand grows in other countries and the product becomes known, there will be a tendency 
to transfer its production to lower-cost locations, either to the foreign country where 
a market was initially created by exports, or to other places for export back to the 
country where the original innovation was made. This process of transfer of productive 
facilities will be associated with the transition from "new" to "standardized" products, 
while potential competition increases the elasticity of demand, thus making low-cost 
production increasingly important. 
Historically, the classical and neoclassical arguments of the theory of 
international trade have been used as justifications for the pursuit of free trade 
policies in the context of expansion of the capitalist system of production. The 
reasoning could be summarized as follows. Each country should specialize in the 
production and export of commodities to be determined on the basis of the production 
factors that it has available in abundance and that allow it to obtain the maximum 
benefits from its resource endowments. If all countries were to act this way, their 
productive resources would be used more efficiently, thanks to an international division 
of labour arising spontaneously out of rational behaviour. The world market would be a 
complex of reciprocally advantageous trade deals from which all countries would benefit 
and in which their interests would be harmonized. Furthermore, the argument also 
postulates that trade taking place under these conditions would lead to the gradual 
elimination of the differences in economic development prevailing among countries. 
However, the historically observed facts on the expansion of trade do not 
support the postulates of this theory and point in a different direction. Differences 
among some regions and countries have diminished, primarily as a result of the 
international expansion of the capitalist system, but at the same time this process has 
led to an increase in unequal development for other regions and to an absolute transfer 
of surplus from the developing areas of the world to the industrialized ones (witness 
the arguments on the deterioration of the terms of trade) (28). While it cannot be 
ignored that comparative costs play an important role in international trade, neither 
can it be ignored that trade flows have been imposed and controlled by the industrialized 
nations to their own benefit. This has not been considered by neoclassical economists 
primarily because they tend to identify production costs with merchandise costs; this 
implies considering profits as the remuneration for a given production factor and it 
ignores the fact that the price at which commodities are traded significantly exceeds 
production costs, leading to an international transfer of surplus. This phenomenon is 
increased by the monopolistic domination of production and markets and has been 
underestimated by neoclassical economists. 
In reality, the actual conditions under which trade takes place differ sharply 
from the ideal conditions implied in the neoclassical arguments in favour of free trade 
and in the assumption of free determination by each country of its "advantageous" 
activities. In a critical review of advances in the theory and empirical analysis of 
trade, Johnson mentions some shortcomings of the traditional neoclassical school: 
"The fundamental pro bl em, the conflict between empi ri ca 1 findings and the 
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theoretical models, can be seen in part as a continuation in the international trade 
field of the debate begun in the 1930's over the issue of monopolistic as contrasted 
with perfect, competition - with the important difference that monopolistic competition 
is now viewed as a rational corollary in the evolution of technology in a free 
enterprise system rather than as a manifestation of consumer irrationality. The new 
empirical research stresses the influence on international trade patterns of factors 
determining monopolistically competitive ability - technological leadership, economies 
of scale, and product variation (non-standardization). The orthodox theoretical 
tradition stresses differences in the classical determinants of wealth - specifically, 
capita 1 per head - on the ass ump ti on of a broadly competitive i nternationa 1 economy" ( 29). 
The contributions of both Posner and Vernon begin to introduce these issues into 
the theory of international trade, although they fall short of examining the wide-ranging 
implications of technologically determined advantages, coupled with a high degree of 
monopolistic control over production and markets, for the developing countries. The 
capacity to create comparative advantages as a result of technical innovations and to 
transfer them rapidly is used to maintain and create new opportunities to enhance 
monopolistic control. Less developed countries, lacking such technological capacity, 
have no alternative but to be exporters of primary products or, in certain cases, to 
assemble parts and components imported from the industrialized countries, thus becoming 
satellites or workshops of enterprises from the industrialized world. 
Schumpeter's Theory of Innovation 
Although Schumpeter remains within the conceptual framework of neoclassical 
theory (or rather, he supports some of the postulates of the classical economists like 
Smith, Ricardo, Walras, and Marshall), his thoughts on the instability of capitalism 
and on the central role that innovations play in creating such instability succeed in 
expanding greatly the scope of the neoclassical approach and its ability to understand 
the processes of economic evolution and technical change. 
Schumpeter does not take issue with the traditional theory of Walras or 
Marshall; he considers it useful provided it is confined to the analysis of stationary 
or "steadily growing" processes where any disturbances that may enter are handled by 
what he calls "passive adaptation," that is, "adaptation within the fundamental data 
of the system" (30). However, he finds Walrasian-Marshallian theories insufficient 
when the business community under consideration faces new possibilities for action, 
which are as yet untried and about which even the most complete command of routine 
teaches little. He develops his theory of innovation to handle situations where the 
course of technical progress introduces disturbances, leading to a type of adaptation 
that consists of "changing the internal characteristics of the system." 
Schumpeter defines innovation as "the setting up of a new production function" 
and introduces it as the main cause for the waves and disequilibria that characterize 
the capitalist system. To him "what dominates the picture of capitalistic life and is 
more than anything else responsible for our impression of a prevalence of decreasing 
cost, causing disequilibria, cutthroat competition and so on, is innovation, the 
intrusion into the system of new production functions which incessantly shift existing 
cost curves." 
Schumpeter's theory of innovation postulates three basic assumptions. First, 
innovations entail the construction of new plant and equipment - or the rebuilding of 
old plant - requiring noneligible time and investment. This implies restricting the 
concept of innovation to a change of the first order in the production function. 
Second, every innovation is embodied in a new firm founded for that purpose, primarily 
because "no firm which is merely run on established lines, however conscientious the 
management of its routine business may be, remains in capitalistic society a source of 
profit, and the day comes for each when it ceases to pay interest and even depreciation" 
(31). Third, innovations are always associated with the rise to leadership of new men, 
including the case where a new r.;an takes care of an old firm (which would be an 
exception to the second assumption). It is particularly interesting that Schumpeter 
also considered the case of giant corporations that are "shells within which an 
ever-changing personnel may go from innovation to innovation." In his view this process 
would become more important with the passage of time and would replace the system of 
"competitive capitalism" with a system he called "trustified capitalism" (32). 
In his analysis of innovation Schumpeter awarded a most important role to the 
entrepreneur, whom he distinguished from the manager. For him "it is leadership rather 
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than ownership that matters," and consequently his economic theories put substantial 
weight on sociological factors (33). 
In putting together the action of the entrepreneur, the process of innovation, 
and the evolution of capitalism, Schumpeter took a very important step toward a clearer 
understanding of the relation between technology and economic evolution, thereby 
enabling the neoclassical school to proceed beyond the framework provided by static 
analysis. Nevertheless, it is interesting that although he was confident that the 
disturbances brought about by technological innovations would not destroy what he 
considered the inherent economic instability of the capitalist system, he thought the 
social implications of capitalism would lead to its eventual replacement: 
" ... capitalism, whilst economically stable, and even gaining in stability, 
creates, by rationalizing the human mind, a mentality and a style of life incompatible 
with its own fundamental conditions, and will be changed, although not by economic 
necessity and probably at some sacrifice of economic welfare, into an order of things 
which it will be merely a matter of taste to call socialism or not" (34). 
The Factor Proportions Problem and the Choice of Techniques 
Another set of developments that uses the instruments of neoclassical theory to 
examine the problem of technology and its relation to development focuses on the 
availability of factors of production, their relative prices, the existence of techniques 
that use these factors in different proportions, and the process of choosing techniques. 
In its simplest theoretical formulation the model uses a two-factor (capital and labour) 
production function as the basic tool. It is postulated that for a given quantity of 
output and a given relation between the prices of capital and labour, there exists an 
"optimal combination" of these two factors, i.e., a production technique, that should be 
used to minimize costs. Assuming the choice is rational, departures from the optimal 
combination are explained in terms of distortion of factor prices from the "true" prices 
that would reflect their relative scarcity, and also in terms of the inexistence of 
techniques that would correspond in practice to the theoretical optimum. 
This problem was first brought to the attention of development economists by 
Eckaus (35), who proposed a set of hypotheses to explain the existence of unemployment 
and underemployment in developing areas in terms of "the factor proportions problem." 
He distinguished between two types of explanations that may be derived from this point 
of view: 
"The first type assumes that available technology would permit full use of the 
working force at some set of relative prices and finds the source of unemployment in 
various types of 'imperfections' in the price system. The second type suggests that 
there are limitations in the existing technology or the structure of demand which lead 
to a redundancy of labour in densely populated underdeveloped areas" (36). 
The "relative factor price distortions approach" postulates that the main 
reason for the choice of inappropriate technologies in less developed countries is that 
they have pursued economic and social development strategies that have unduly cheapened 
the cost of capital in relation to labour costs. Overvalued exchange rates, tax and 
credit subsidies, and excessively protective tariffs against competitive imports have 
artificially lowered the cost of capital to investors, while social policies, the 
pressure of trade unions, and various welfare measures (usually adopted in imitation 
of developed countries before the economic system is capable of supporting them) have 
raised the cost of labour far above its "natural cost." The argument concludes that 
capital-intensive techniques have been encouraged and labour-using ones discouraged, 
and that under these circumstances rational entrepreneurs would tend to import more 
capital-intensive techniques than if the relative factor prices had reflected the 
"true" or "socially correct" prices based on the relative abundance or scarcity of 
production factors. 
Felix (37) has made a thorough criticism of this approach in the Latin American 
context. After reviewing the main claims and policy implications of the problem of 
factor proportions from the relative price distortions point of view, he concludes: 
"The main virtue of the approach is that it emphasizes ... that the 
inappropriate choice of technology in Latin American countries reflects market forces 
that bias entrepreneurial decisions in a socially suboptimal direction, rather than 
merely an inadequate inflow and dissemination of technological information from abroad. 
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The critical deficiency of the relative price distortion approach is its underlying 
theoretical model. The model is based on institutional and behavioural assumptions that 
abstract from such central real world phenomena as: uneven capacities to generate 
technology between countries, increasing economies of scale, uncertainty and uneven 
financial constraints on accumulation between small and large firms, oligopolistic 
competition, and plastic consumer preferences. It is nevertheless the basic normative 
model which guides the global prescriptions for optimizing technological borrowing by 
peripheral countries through eliminating relative price distortions, even though the 
model provides no analysis of either the complex forces, other than the relative prices, 
that govern technological progress in the centre countries, nor of the sociopsychological 
forces, other than the relative prices and incomes, that influence consumer choice in the 
peri phera 1 countries" ( 38). 
The "lack of appropriate technologies" suited to the conditions of less 
developed countries has also received wide attention in the literature. Eckaus himself 
pointed out the need for research into the problem of finding technologies "adapted to 
the conditions of underdeveloped areas" ( 39). A plethora of concepts and terms, such 
as "intermediate, labour-intensive, adequate, soft, progressive, low-cost," etc., have 
been proposed to characterize the new technologies, which do not exist or have fallen 
into disuse, and which should be generated and utilized, in the less developed areas (40). 
One of the most ardent proponents of the use of such technologies, particularly in the 
rural areas, is Schumacher (41), who considers that the main task of development is "to 
bring into existence millions of new workplaces in the rural areas and small towns ... 
modern industry, as it has arisen in the developed countries, cannot possibly fulfill 
this task •.. it has arisen in societies which are rich in capital and short of labour and 
therefore cannot possibly be appropriate for societies short of capital and rich in 
labour" (42). 
Schumacher goes beyond the neoclassical framework in his analysis of 
appropriate technologies, although he uses some concepts from this school. He defines the 
main task of development, emphasizing the rural areas, in terms of four propositions: 
"First, that workplaces have to be created in the areas where the people are 
living now, and not primarily in metropolitan areas into which they tend to migrate. 
"Second, that these workplaces must be, on average, cheap enough so that they 
can be created in large numbers without this calling for an unattainable level of 
capital formation and imports. 
"Third, that the production methods employed must be relatively simple, so that 
the demands for high skills are minimized, ... 
"Fourth, that production should be mainly from local materials and mainly for 
local use. These requirements can be met only if there is a 'regional' approach to 
development and, second, if there is a conscious effort to develop and apply what may 
be called an 'intermediate technology' (43) ... Such an intermediate technology would 
be immensely more productive than the indigenous technology (which is often in a 
condition of decay), but it would also be immensely cheaper than the sophisticated, 
highly capital-intensive technology of modern industry" (44). 
The question of convergence between the factor endowment of a particular 
country and the utilization of factors in productive activities, which is in essence the 
problem of availability and use of appropriate technologies, has also been considered by 
several authors as the central problem in socioeconomic development. For example, 
Lange (45) defines an underdeveloped economy as one in which the total stock of capital 
is insufficient to absorb the labour force using existing modern techniques of 
production. Unless new "appropriate" technologies become avai 1 able, these countries 
will either have to employ the modern techniques, use up all their limited capital and 
then face massive unemployment, or use traditional low-productivity techniques that do 
not generate enough surplus to employ an expanding labour force at an adequate level of 
income. In either case the basic problems of underdevelopment remain. An African 
economist, Onyemelukwe (46), has recently gone as far as proposing that the "key to 
development theory lies in the right application of factor proportions - capital, labour 
and raw materials," and that: 
"The adoption of factor proportions which are in line with the surrounding 
factor endowments is a necessary condition for a development process. It follows that 
adoption of factor proportions which are out of line with those of the surrounding area 
might in itself choke off mass participation and lead to a development process which is 
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controlled either by outsiders or by government or both" (47). 
Thus the evolution of concepts regarding the problem of factor proportions, 
insofar as they deal with the nonavailability of techniques, transcends the framework of 
traditional neoclassical analysis. Furthermore, although the original formulation 
referred to the issue of unemployment, recent developments have examined the choice of 
techniques from a broader point of view, making it one of the key issues in the study of 
development processes (48). 
THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF ROSTOW'S STAGES OF GROWTH THEORY 
The interrelations between science, technology, and economic growth have also 
been studied from a historical perspective, and although many alternative ways of 
examining these interrelations have been offered, it is interesting to review Rostow's 
concept of "stages of growth" because of the controversy it has generated and the central 
role it awards to technological change. 
Rostow's intention in formulating his theory was to provide a description and an 
explanation of the process of economic growth. In doing so he proposed a linear 
interpretation of economic history, postulating five stages through which all countries 
must pass before reaching the levels of the present advanced societies: the traditional 
or preNewtonian stage; the preconditions for take-off; the take-off into self-sustained 
growth; the drive to technological maturity; and the age of mass consumption (49). 
In the first stage, traditional societies evolve within the limits of productive 
activities based on preNewtonian techniques and attitudes. There exists a ceiling to the 
level of per capita production that can be obtained. These limits to agricultural 
production, to industrial output and employment, to the level of population that can be 
sustained, and so on, arise because access to modern scientific and technical 
possibilities cannot be secured in a regular and systematic way. Newton's concepts are 
singled out by Rostow because they represent a basic psychological change whereby man 
accepted the view that the physical world is capable of being understood and manipulated 
in terms of relatively few stable rules. 
The second stage, the preconditions for take-off, is considered as "the period 
during which a traditional society becomes sufficiently modernized in all its dimensions 
to undertake the first serious, even if limited, phase of the enterprise which, more than 
any other, is the hallmark of modernity; that is, industrialization, including, of course, 
regular innovation in agriculture, transport, communication and other services" (50). 
This transition to modernity is punctuated by the acceptance of the Newtonian view of 
the world, the emergence of a new type of entrepreneur willing to invest in 
nontraditional activities such as industry, and the existence of a minimum stock of social 
overhead capital. It is also postulated that "society must mobilize from its own 
resources (and, where possible, from capital imports) the materials, labour, and skills 
required for a massive buildup of social overhead capital, notably to provide education, 
transport and energy" (51). 
The take-off into self-sustained growth is the third stage of Rostow's theory. 
Initially he defined the take-off as "the interval during which the rate of investment 
increases in such a way that real output per capita rises and this initial increase 
carries with it radical changes in production technic,ues and the disposition of income 
flows which perpetuate the new scale of investment and perpetuate thereby the rising 
trend in per capita output" (52). Rostow points out that the take-off is confined to 
relatively few sectors, and possibly to limited regions within a nation, and that modern 
industrialization expands rapidly during it. Furthermore, this process of 
industrialization lifts the restraints on income per capita built into the dynamics of 
the preNewtonian world. Although Rostow considers the problems involved in a possible 
deceleration of growth in particular sectors of industry, he also points out that the 
"flow of modern science and technology may offer the potentiality of fending off 
Ricardian diminishing returns indefinitely," and thus concludes that "the experience of 
take-off appears, on present evidence, to be a definitive transition, like the loss of 
innocence." 
The following stage of the drive to technological maturity is defined as a 
period, considerably longer than the take-off, during which the economy begins to absorb 
and apply more or less fully what the unfolding stream of science and technology can 
provide. The basic and capital goods industries take the lead, agriculture becomes 
modernized, the educational system expands to meet the needs of industrialization, and 
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an efficient communications network is established. The economy expands and finds its 
place within the international scene, although this expansion may take place at the 
expense of less advanced societies. 
Finally, the age of mass consumption completes this evolutionary scheme. 
Industrial leadership passes on to the durable consumer goods industry - with the 
automobile becoming the key symbol - and to the provision of services. Income per capita 
grows so as to allow a large segment of the population to move beyond the satisfaction 
of basic needs, thus changing the structure of the labour force and its special 
distribution. Society stops accepting as an article of faith the need to expand modern 
technology and begins to consider it as a subordinate objective. The welfare state 
emerges in full force and becomes the main political manifestation of a society that 
has moved beyond technological maturity. Rostow is unclear about the possible subsequent 
evolution of societies beyond the age of mass consumption, although he visualizes a 
stage where the main emphasis is placed on the "search for quality," which he defines 
as the "enrichment of private life." 
The central role awarded by Rostow to technological change, and to industrial 
technology in particular, has led to attempts at defining parallel concepts for science 
and technology. For example, a summary of the long-term plan for scientific and 
technological development of Korea (53), drafted in the late 1960's, linked the take-off 
stage with the dependence on production facilities, techniques, and plant engineering 
in advanced countries, and with the growth of import substitution industries. The drive 
to technological maturity was associated with the expansion of plant engineering 
capabilities and metal-mechanic industries, with the transition from capital equipment 
imports to imports of technology, with at least 50% technological self-sufficiency in 
productive techniques for light industries, and with a continued import of facilities, 
techniques, and services for heavy chemical industries and high-technology industries 
such as electronics. Finally, the age of mass production was associated with 
technological self-sufficiency in light industries, with the import of some facilities 
and techniques for heavy chemical industries, with the expansion of technical and 
engineering exports, with the promotion of international confidence in Korean industrial 
standards, and with an increase in the sales of patents and technical know-how. 
Rostow's theory of stages of growth has been widely criticized. The linear 
model of development, which postulates a unique path through which all countries must 
proceed before becoming "advanced," has been considered unacceptable for most developing 
countries at present. The parallels Rostow draws between the historical evolution of 
the presently industrialized countries and the developing ones have been shown to be 
inadequate in many instances (54). Of particular interest is the general warning that 
Kuznets makes about the validity of comparisons between the early stages of development 
of industrialized societies and the present condition of the less developed countries: 
"Both the absolute and relative economic position, as well as the general cast 
of the immediately antecedent history, of the now developed countries in their 
pre-industrial phase were cardinally different from the economic position and the 
immediate historical heritage of the underdeveloped countries of today. It is, therefore, 
far from safe to extrapolate economic or demographic aspects from the earlier records for 
the developed countries to current and prospective levels for the underdeveloped" (55). 
In his Nobel prize lecture, delivered in 1971, Kuznets emphasized the role of 
technology in creating the differences between the earlier stages of development of 
industrialized countries and the present situation of the developing ones: 
" ... the stock of material and social technology that can be tapped by 
less-developed countries today is enormously larger than that available in the 19th 
and even early 20th centuries. But it is precisely this combination of greater 
backwardness and seemingly greater backlog of technology that makes for the significant 
differences between the growth position of the less-developed countries when they were 
entering the modern economic growth process" (56). 
" ..• a substantial economic advance in the less developed countries may require 
modifications in the available stock of material technology, and probably even greater 
innovations in political and social structure. It will not be a matter of merely 
borrowing existing tools, material and social, or of directly applying past patterns of 
growth, merely allowing for differences in parameters" (57). 
Therefore, although Rostow's concepts provide an appealing and apparently 
simple blueprint, great caution should be exerted in extrapolating his historical 
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findings to examine the present condition of less developed countries and derive policy 
recommendations (58). 
THE "STRUCTURALIST" VIEW OF THE U.N. ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA 
The approach to economic development theory and strategy of the U.N. Economic 
Commission for Latin America (ECLA) and its most representative economists (Prebisch, 
Pinto, and Furtado, among others) emphasizes the structural conditions that characterize 
the underdevelopment of Latin American countries and that are the result of their 
historical evolution and insertion intJ the world economy (59). 
ECLA's conceptualization of the processes of economic development and 
underdevelopment differs from those of the neoclassical school and from the historical 
deterministic approach of Rostow. In contrast with the neoclassical way of theorizing, 
ECLA's starting point is with historically observed facts and present conditions, i.e., 
things as they are, rather than things as they should be, derived from theoretical 
models. While the historical context is taken into consideration explicitly, this is 
done in a way radically different from Rostow: instead of describing a linear process 
followed (or to be followed) more or less independently by each country, the ECLA school 
emphasizes the structural economic interrelations among developed and less developed 
countries, showing that the development of some countries has taken place at the expense 
of the underdevelopment of others (60). Furtado summarizes this point of view in the 
fo 11 owing terms: 
"As a consequence of the rapid spread of new production methods from a small 
number of centres radiating technological innovations, there has come to existence a 
process tending to create a worldwide economic system. It is thus that underdevelopment 
is considered a creature of development, or rather, as a consequence of the impact of 
the technical processes and the international division of labour commanded by the small 
number of societies that espoused the industrial revolution of the 19th century. The 
resulting relations between these societies and the underdeveloped areas involve forms 
of dependence that can hardly be overcome ... underdevelopment cannot be studied as a 
'phase' of the development process since such a 'phase' would be overcome if certain 
factors came into play simultaneously. And, since the underdeveloped economies are 
contemporaries of - and in one way or another, dependent on - their developed 
counterparts, the former cannot retrace the experiences of the latt~r. Therefore, 
development and underdevelopment should be considered as two aspects of the same 
historical process involving the creation and the spread of modern technology" (61). 
Originally, in the work published in the 1950's ECLA economists gave primary 
importance to the type of participation that Latin American economies had in the 
international division of labour, as shown by their critical analysis of the 
deterioration in the terms of trade and the use of concepts such as ''dependence, centre, 
and periphery." Later, in the l960's ECLA devoted most of its analysis to the internal 
problems of development, such as the bottlenecks for the expansion of import 
substitution industrialization. It was recognized that changes in the internal 
structure of production usually emerged as a response to problems posed by the type of 
participation of the developing countries in international trade, and the primary 
concern was to rearrange the internal productive machinery to participate in 
international trade on a more profitable and equitable basis. However, the nature of 
the international capitalist division of labour was not generally questioned by the 
ECLA school, and thus the model proposed was one of inward development within the 
framework of capitalism. 
Though a critique can be made of ECLA's interpretation of the historical 
evolution of Latin American economies, the characterization has been widely accepted. 
ECLA divides Latin American economic history into four phases as follows: the phase 
prior to outward development, which lasted until the middle of the last century; the 
phase of outward development and integration in the international capitalist division 
of labour, approximately from 1870 to 1930; the phase of inward development, based 
primarily on import substitution industrialization and spanning approximately from 
1930 to the middle of the 1950's; and the phase of stagnation, covering basically the 
1960' s. 
ECLA points out that outward growth depends on the dynamism of the demand for 
export products, which conditions the expansion of the exporting sector and hence the 
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growth of internal production and employment. Export activities depend on the nature of 
available resources, which would also determine the type of technologic.al imports that 
are necessary (equipment and machinery, know-how, technical personnel), as well as the 
degree of local adaptation and assimilation of technologies. Given the incipient 
character of the scientific, industrial, and technological infrastructure, these 
adaptations are generally the result of isolated efforts, and technological requirements 
are mostly met from imports, which will usually be capital intensive. This creates a 
pattern of technological "enclaves" with insignificant internal multiplying effects. 
It is also argued that the narrowness of the domestic market is related to the 
predominance of outward-oriented demand in the sense that the available surplus is 
either sent abroad directly or used to increase and diversify consumption by the local 
wealthy minority. Furthermore, the export sector attained a high productivity and 
profitability due to the extremely favourable conditions granted by the state. Resource 
allocation policies were designed to provide the infrastructure for outward growth 
(public utilities, railroads, roads, etc.), and the construction sector - with its easily 
acquired and mastered technology - showed great dynamism. 
ECLA concludes that any effort to expand and diversify internal production -
that is, any effort toward industrialization - would imply a high level of accumulation 
that is far beyond the resources obtainable from the export sector, which is continuously 
vulnerable to fluctuations in prices and foreign demand. ECLA holds that because of the 
limitations of the external sector in creating investable surplus, and because industrial 
expansion and diversification require the use of increasingly complex and expensive 
technologies, it was difficult for the impulse for industrialization to arise internally. 
External events, such as the crisis of the 1930's and World War II, provided the 
necessary stimulus. The crisis of the 1930's constricted the exports of Latin American 
countries, reducing their capability to import and forcing them to develop an internal 
productive machinery. World War II increased export earnings and limited import 
capacity, making feasible the development of domestic production. In both cases, 
industrialization appears in the ECLA analysis as a response and as an effort to 
substitute goods that cannot be imported. 
The way ECLA links external demand to the internal market and the technological 
implications of its expansion make it possible to conceive the import substitution 
strategy. ECLA's analysis then focuses on the internal conditions and restrictions 
that hinder industrial development, while at the same time it describes the favourable 
foreign junctures that should allow industrialization to take place. 
For ECLA, technology ranks highly among the factors that shape the import 
substitution process. It says that the type of technical progress prevailing in 
industrialized countries explains why the income elasticity of its demand for primary 
imports - that is, the demand for export products from developing countries - is less 
than one. Thus, when the income of developing countries increases at a rate equal to, 
or higher than, the rate in developed countries, imports by developing countries 
(durable consumer, intermediate, and capital goods) tend to grow faster than their 
exports (raw and semiprocessed materials). The increased demand for imports, determined 
by the type of industrialization, requires identifying those imports that must be 
substituted by domestic production so as to be able to import the rest. The ECLA 
analysis is however not applicable to all types of raw materials exported by Latin 
American countries, food products in particular. 
The ECLA theorists postulate that import substitution first concentrates on 
technologically simple goods (especially light industry) because of unawareness or lack 
of knowledge about more advanced production technologies and also because of the 
restrictions imposed by the nature of the internal market. Thus, in the first stage 
of the import substitution process (called the stage of "easy" substitution} the 
percentage of imported consumer goods decreases at the same time that industrial 
development is limited to certain specific branches and industries. 
ECLA acknowledges that the import substitution industrialization pattern has 
increased the requirements for imported technology, which is capital intensive and thus 
responsible for the small labour absorption capacity of industry. To generate 
sufficient employment under such conditions would demand a considerable internal 
investment and capitalization effort, which would be strongly handicapped by the low 
levels of domestic income and savings. On the other hand, the indivisibility of 
productive techniques makes it mandatory to produce at scales higher than those 
strictly required by the narrow local markets. Thus there appears a lack of 
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compatibility between the technologies used and the supply of labour, as reflected in 
high unemployment and underemployment levels, high rates of idle installed capacity, and 
the relative lack of financial resources for further investment (62). 
Technology is one factor, among others, which contributes to the external 
bottleneck that hinders the import substitution process. As industrialization progresses 
and with it, import requirements, it is necessary to broaden the scope of substitution 
to durable consumer goods, intermediate goods, and capital goods. This is the so-called 
"difficult" substitution stage, not only because of the greater complexity of the 
technology incorporated in such goods, but also because they demand scales of production 
and investment that clash with the narrowness of the markets of developing countries 
(perhaps with the exception of countries such as Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico). Many 
of these goods then continue to be imported, making the problem of reduction of the 
compressible import margin more serious, and the overall economy more vulnerable to 
fluctuations in the price levels and the demand for exports. Therefore, as a result of 
a more complex set of internal factors, there arises a similar problem to the one that 
resulted from the outward growth phase. 
ECLA postulates that the deepening of inward growth is endangered by the 
survival of rigid and archaic agricultural and social structures, which, among other 
things, are responsible for the limited capacity for internal generation of savings and 
investment funds. For ECLA, imbalances in the agricultural sector apparently do not 
have a technological origin but rather are the result of the prevailing land-owning and 
tenure system: large landholdings (latifundia) underutilize land and labour; minute 
landholdings (minifundia) put intrinsic constraints on capitalization and increases in 
productivity. Therefore, sources of internal financing cannot replace financing from 
the external sector. ECLA recommended the implementation of agrarian reforms tending 
to make agriculture an effective foundation for industrialization. It suggested the 
implementation of social changes (redistribution of income, increased employment, 
deconcentration and decentralization of the productive machinery, etc.) that would 
encourage the development of productive forces and allow the acceleration of internal 
accumulation. All of this assumed a state capable of planning and promoting development. 
Thus, this school of thought provided an explanatory base for various reformist and 
nationalistic ideologies that aimed at modernizing the economy by developing the local 
bourgeoisie. 
Contrary to ECLA's expectations, the outward growth phase has continued alone 
or overlapping with inward growth processes, for it is clear that all the Latin American 
countries have continued to depend on the export of raw materials during the past three 
decades. Therefore, the outward development stage did not end in the 1930's and no 
country has been able to sever its primary export links with the international system. 
In the mid and late 1960's the import substitution strategy linked to inward growth 
began to be questioned (63) and a renewed concern with employment problems was voiced (64). 
The concept of "enclave'' and its subsequent derivations are of particular 
importance for technology. Initially it differentiated between a technologically modern 
export sector and a traditional sector linked to the domestic market. This led later to 
the concept of "technological dualism," which refers to the coexistence, both within and 
between economic sectors, of productive activities and units using advanced techniques 
with others using archaic or obsolete technologies. The former were, in some way or 
other, linked to foreign markets or foreign sources of technology, while the latter used 
almost exclusively productive techniques of local origin. 
The concept of technological dualism was later abandoned in favour of the more 
realistic and complex concept of "structural heterogeneity." According to Pinto: 
" ... the emerging situation has meant leaving behind - at least for the 
relatively more developed economies - that schema of technological dualism which could 
have been characteristic of the past, and opening the way to a much more complex reality 
of structural heterogeneity ... As an inevitable consequence of the particular structural 
heterogeneity - and although, indeed, this is not the only factor influencing this 
matter - the fruits of technical progress have tended to be hoarded primarily by those 
who have greater organic links with the productive and territorial nuclei of the modern 
strata" (his emphasis) (65). 
As a consequence of the financing needs of Latin American countries, of the 
nature of the import substitution industrialization process, and of the expansion of 
multinational corporations (MNCs), foreign investment began to play a dominant role in 
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the dynamic sectors of Latin American economies during the 1960's. The implications of 
this situation have been examined carefully by ECLA in its 1973 "Economic Study of 
Latin America." However, the most interesting studies of the impact of MNCs in Latin 
America have been made by other economists who are of the "structuralist" school of 
thought but who have not been associated with ECLA for a long time. Sunkel (66) has 
postulated that the national disintegration process now taking place in most Latin 
American societies is the reflection of a broader trend toward transnational capitalist 
integration, which links the elites of the developing countries with the central 
countries. In this process of transnational integration and national disintegration, 
MNCs play a major instrumental role, based primarily on their control of technology and 
of the access to markets (67). Furtado (68) holds that the capacity to control technical 
progress and to impose consumption patterns has been the decisive factor in the 
structuring of the productive system of the dependent countries. In the new 
international economy that is now emerging with the forceful expansion of MNCs, the main 
characteristic is that technology, materialized in equipment and the design of consumer 
goods, tends to be less and less the object of market transactions and is transferred 
internally among the various component firms of the MNCs. Given the imitative pattern 
of development of the peripheral countries, particularly with regard to consumption, the 
access to technical innovation is a necessary condition for their dependent growth (69). 
Furtado has also emphasized the importance of technology in the process of 
development. In the concluding chapter of his book "Economic Development of Latin 
America," he attaches particular significance to: 
"Reconstruction of economic structures with a view to intensifying the 
assimilation of modern technology in all productive sectors ... 
"Formulation of employment policies capable of putting an end to the present 
process of growing social marginalization •... The solution to this complex problem calls 
for a minimum of autonomous technology which the countries of the region at present do 
not possess. 
"The achievement of a minimum of technological autonomy ••. Given the 
peculiarities of the region's natural resources, particularly in the case of the 
tropical and subtropical areas, and in view of the sui generis aspects of the economy, 
Latin America's development calls for a concerted effort in promoting technological 
research and the background sciences required to consolidate and develop research 
findings" (70). 
The structuralist school of thought is practically the only descriptive and 
explanatory construct offered by the less developed countries to examine the problems 
of development and the role that technology plays in it (71). Its relevance to the 
African and Asian countries has been demonstrated through their influence on intellectual 
developments and on economic policy (72). However, it is pertinent that the ECLA version 
of the structuralist school did not suggest radical alternatives to the present mode of 
insertion of the developing countries into the international economic system. ECLA has 
taken an economic point of view without paying much attention to the connection between 
productive structures and internal sociopolitical structures. Other writers of the 
structuralist school of thought, Furtado for example, have given considerable attention 
to these issues, which were largely ignored by ECLA. 
THE CONCEPTS OF DEPENDENCE AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEPENDENCE (73) 
As the implementation of import substitution policies proceeded in Latin 
America in the 1960's according to the strategy proposed by ECLA, and as direct foreign 
investment began to play an increasingly dominant role in economic growth, the problem 
of balance of payments became more acute. There was also a slack demand for primary 
export products, and the problem of unemployment emerged in full view. Nothing suggested 
an improvement in regressive forms of income distribution, agrarian reform was carried 
out timidly and did not produce the anticipated results, and the modernization of 
productive and social structures proposed by ECLA appeared insufficient to deal with 
the "stagnation" of Latin American development. 
The lack of any long-term prospect for growth and development, and the evidence 
that national entrepreneurs were unable to develop on their own a capitalist economy as 
happened in Europe a century earlier, prompted a critical revision of the structuralist 
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ideas and led to the emergence of dependency theory. While preserving the framework of 
centre-periphery relations borrowed from the ECLA structuralist school, the theory of 
dependence attempts to go beyond the improvement of economic conditions through 
modernization, seeking to explain the mechanics of underdevelopment and to establish the 
basis for a new theory of development. 
There are indisputable and sometimes fundamental differences among the views of 
the leading dependency theorists (Cardoso, Gunder Frank, Dos Santos, Sunkel and Paz, 
Quijano, and Kaplan, among others). Nevertheless, corrrnon roots can be found in the 
criticism of ECLA's structuralism in the context of economic stagnation, and in the 
Marxist critique of capitalist development, in particular the theories of imperialism. 
It is interesting that the majority of the dependency theorists were sociologists trying 
to go beyond the strictly economic perspective of ECLA's structuralist views (74). 
Dependence refers to a type of domination/subordination relationship between 
productive structures in capitalist regions or countries of unequal levels of development. 
The theory of dependence states that underdevelopment is not innate to countries but is 
brought about by the expansion of capitalism, which at a later stage became identified 
with the growth of multinational corporations. 
In opposition to other theories of development, which stress the existence of 
mechanisms that spread growth automatically (foreign trade, foreign investment, education 
and manpower training, income distribution, and so on), the theory of dependence 
emphasizes the existence of structural mechanisms that obstruct economic evolution 
and prevent society at large from reaping the benefits of economic growth. Such blocking 
mechanisms would often be the same ones that generate growth in industrialized capitalist 
economies, but in developing societies they would function in the opposite direction. 
For example, international trade would act as an "engine of growth" in developed 
economies, but in developing countries it would be a source of distortions, creating 
enclaves, leading to balance of payments problems, and promoting imitative consumption 
patterns. 
According to this view, the means of domination may be found in all the economic 
and social functions that permit the expansion of the capitalist industrialized countries: 
accumulation of capital, trade, technical innovation, education, and so on. Because 
these are precisely the mechanisms of economic growth, the theory of dependence 
postulates that the condition of subordination or domination provides a context that 
changes the nature of these mechanisms in a perverse way. This leads to the 
globalization of the concept of dependence, and most authors tend to reproduce 
statements such as the one made by Aguilar (75): "In the case of Latin America one 
should speak of a dependence or structural subordination, i.e., a dependence that is 
economic, technological, cultural, and even military, that deeply influences at the 
same time the shape of all the socioeconomic structure and that, in particular, 
conditions many of the main features of the system and the process of development." 
Dependency theory also links the external domination of developing countries to 
forms of internal domination and internalized structures of dependence. Thus the 
predominance of urban over rural areas in developing countries is seen as the logical 
translation of external domination, and the local urban bourgeoisie is seen as playing 
the same role internally that international capital plays in intercountry dependency 
relations. 
The need to make dependency theory more operational has forced students of 
dependence to focus on particular aspects of the dependency syndrome, leading to studies 
of trade dependence, financial dependence, cultural dependence, technological dependence, 
and so on, although always acknowledging the interconnection among these types of 
dependence and usually attempting to provide a hierarchical framework for their 
analysis. 
Technological Dependence 
In the early 1970's with the need to make dependency theory more operational, 
the concept of technological dependence began to gain wide acceptability. It was 
postulated that the nature of domination relations between developed and developing 
countries was moving from the control of primary products for export to the control of 
productive facilities, to the control of finance, and to the control of technological 
knowledge as the main vehicle for maintaining the relations of domination. While 
several of these forms of domination coexisted, a clear trend was seen as emerging in 
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the direction pointed out. It was further suggested that "in this process of mutation 
of dominant relations technology has been always behind as a conditioning factor, but it 
has now finally emerged out in the open, partly because of the internal dynamics of the 
evolution of the capitalist system, and partly because of the increased control of the 
less developed countries over the means through which the developed countries exerted 
their domination in the past" (76). 
O'Donnell summarizes the current view of technological dependence as follows: 
" ... the problem of technological dependence is an aspect or a dimension of the 
general problem of dependence which manifests itself also in cultural, military and 
economic aspects among others. Not withstanding this, it is possible, of course, to 
distinguish in an analytical and empirical fashion the first dimension so as to make it 
a valid and undoubtedly important object of research •... The fact that this distinction 
is possible does not imply, on the other hand, that the analysis may omit reference to 
the other dimensions, nor that in the final analysis the whole of these dimensions may 
not be seen as part of the global characteristics of given societies and the ways they 
insert in the international context .... Technological dependence, like all other 
dimensions of dependence, implies an asymmetrical relation of power. In this case we 
are concerned with the power to control the information or the know-how necessary to 
detect a need, to analyze, evaluate, generate, concretize the production of goods or 
services which aim at satisfying the needs of a society at a given moment in time, and 
the necessities of its historical development" (77). 
In another study O'Donnell and Linck (78) have systematized a number of issues 
that are generally raised in relation to dependence, providing an integrated hierarchical 
framework to examine problems such as foreign dominance of decision making, particularly 
in the dynamic sectors of the economy, the country's reliance on foreign finance and 
foreign material inputs, and the overwhelming predominance of foreign technology in the 
modern sector. 
Following a similar line of reasoning Thomas (79) concludes that dependency 
arises as a result of "the lack of organic link, rooted in an indigenous science and 
technology, between the pattern of growth of domestic resource use and the pattern of 
growth of domestic demand." 
It is interesting that this preoccupation with the lack of linkage between 
domestic demand and domestic production is the same problem the ECLA school addressed 
in the early 1950's. The new element introduced is the belief that indigenous science 
and technology can provide the missing link, while 25 years ago import substitution 
industrialization had been heralded as the key solution. This points out the fact that 
when dependency theoreticians refer to internal phenomena, they resort to the scheme and 
categories developed earlier by the structuralist school. Perhaps the main difference 
between these two schools in their conception of technological problems is the emphasis 
given by dependency theory to foreign investment, which is considered as the transmitter 
of a whole pattern of technological dependence. The argument states that capital 
intensive technologies introduced from abroad, primarily through foreign investment, 
accentuate production and market concentration, favouring the interests of foreign 
enterprises that control the necessary capital, technical know-how, and corr.mercialization 
channels. From this some dependentists conclude that the extraction of surplus assumes 
the privileged form of profit flows and technology payments. 
The introduction of technological issues into the study of dependence helped 
to draw a distinction between the concepts of control and ownership of productive 
facilities. It was shown that even though ownership of industry may be in the hands 
of local entrepreneurs or the state, foreign control could still be exerted through the 
provision of key technological inputs. In turn, this control of technology would lead 
to the progressive introduction of other forms of foreign control (financial for 
example), and in many cases to the outright acquisition of established local enterprises. 
Specific studies of technological dependence focused on the drain of foreign 
exchange it generated, on the distortions introduced to the productive structure through 
the adoption of unsuitable technologies, on the loss of control by local enterprises 
over their own operations, and on the segmentation of international markets by the 
suppliers of technology (80). These studies all provided fairly good descriptions of 
technological subordination, but they did not provide specific alternatives, except in 
the form of stressing the need for reforms that would challenge the existing 
international economic order. It is only recently that the alternatives to dependence, 
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and to technological dependence in particular, have begun to be articulated as operational 
strategies. 
The alternative to dependence has been postulated in terms of a transition to 
socialism. Referring to the Argentinian case, O'Donnell and Linck (81) state that this 
is the only way of getting out of dependent capitalist structures "which cannot cease 
operating according to a profoundly inhumane scale of priorities" and they suggest the 
characteristics that an "autonomous socialism" should have. Thomas {82) has developed 
an economic strategy for the transition to socialism, based on what he calls the two 
"iron laws of transformation" converging resource use with demand, and converging needs 
with demand: "Our basic strategy for transforming (underdeveloped) economies is to plan 
the convergence of domestic resource use, domestic demand, and needs in such a way as to 
create the basis for an indigenous technology." 
In his conceptualization he comes close to some ideas of Sraffa and the oligopoly 
theorists who see the choice of products as a basic decision in the strategy of 
development. Technological issues figure prominently in Thomas's formulation of the 
strategy of transition to socialism, considered as the only alternative to dependence (83). 
The recent importance attached to self-reliance, considered as an alternative to 
dependence, has also led to attempts at defining technological self-reliance (84). 
However, because technological dependence does not render itself to be transformed 
directly into policy recommendations, technological self-reliance has tended to remain 
at the same level of generality when it is posed as an alternative to it. Nevertheless, 
there have been some attempts to descend from generalities and to define technological 
self-reliance in operational terms (85). What remains to be integrated into the theory 
of dependence, and also into the alternatives of self-reliance and the transition to 
socialism, is the international strategy that would permit their attainment. The calls 
for a new international economic order require further elaboration before they can provide 
an adequate conceptual background for the realization of the alternatives proposed to 
dependence. Of particular importance in this regard is the expansion of cooperation 
among Third World countries (86). 
THE THEORY OF OLIGOPOLY AND THE ROLE OF TECHNICAL PROGRESS 
Starting in the 1930's a group of neoclassical economists challenged the 
orthodox version of neoclassicism (87). One reason, among many others, for this rupture 
was the need to incorporate into the analysis the process of industrial concentration 
that became evident after the end of the last century, which meant the relative decline 
of capitalist competition and the appearance of large monopolistic or oligopolistic 
enterprises capable of much greater influence over prices and production levels, and of 
control over supply and demand forces. At the same time, this implied the disappearance 
of small enterprises or their transformation into satellites or affiliates of the larger 
ones. 
The theory of oligopoly went far beyond the imperfect competition models, which, 
in essence, are variations of the basic perfect competition model and consider 
concentration to be an "aberration" that deviates from the normal capitalist course of 
events. Oligopoly theory emerged from the confrontation between traditional neoclassical 
concepts and the new industrial realities of late 19th and early 20th century capitalism. 
The concentration processes referred to by these theoreticians consist of increases in 
capital, output, and workers per firm, which would be the result of a grouping of 
enterprises or industrial plants, or of linking enterprises through equity participation. 
Concentration permits the grouped enterprises to set a common policy on investments, 
production, and prices, giving them increased power in the market. 
An oligopoly will arise when the minimum average cost necessary to attain an 
efficient level of production and an optimum utilization of capacity is such that it may 
only be obtained through relatively high production scales, which require significant 
initial outlays, which can only be achieved by a limited number of producers in each 
industry, and which exclude the rest of the producers. This is closely related to the 
concept of "condition of entry," which refers to the advantages enjoyed by es tab 1 i shed 
firms over potential entrants. 
For classical economists (particularly Ricardo), technical progress, defined as 
the introduction of new machines that reduce production costs, should also reduce product 
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P'.i~es. This worked in the competitive environment of early capitalism, which involved 
minimum average costs associated with relatively small levels of output. But this 
mechanism does not operate at the monopolistic stage of capitalism, whftn cost reductions 
would tend to modify prices only if the monopolist felt he could expand his production 
in response to demand elasticity so as to maintain or increase his total revenue. For 
there to be a decrease in prices as a consequence of technical progress, in an oligopoly 
it is necessary to assume that cost reductions imply a reduction in the prices of 
variable production factors and that technological innovations are accessible to all 
enterprises regardless of their size, which are rather strong and unrealistic assumptions. 
What happens in most cases is that the prices remain rigid and revenues vary as 
a result of technical progress, leading to an increase in the profits of firms that 
control the innovation. Rigidity of price reduction is, th.erefore, a fundamental 
element of the oligopolistic structure. 
The possibility of obtaining higher profits for the oligopolistic firms, which 
would be greater than those obtained in competitive markets but smaller than those 
obtainable in a monopolistic situation, is the result of the existence of "barriers to 
entry" to new firms that are potential competitors, and of the trend toward concerted 
patterns of behaviour among the established firms. The effectiveness of the barriers to 
entry, which determines the actual level of profits, will depend on the specific 
advantages enjoyed by the already established firms. According to Bain (88) these 
advantages can be classified into: absolute cost advantages, which derive primarily 
from the control of more efficient productive technologies, from imperfections in the 
inputs and labour markets, and from preferential access to finance; advantages due to 
product differentiation, which result from established consumer preferences and are 
closely linked to product know-how, marketing skill, and corrmercialization structures; 
and advantages of scale in production and distribution, which derive from better 
organization and from horizontal and vertical integration. 
In some modern concentrated industries, electronics for example, prices fall 
sometime after a particular product is launched on the market, and therefore the rigidity 
of price reduction would apparently not exist. However, the price referred to by 
oligopolistic theory is the sum of production costs plus "normal" profits. Any profit 
higher than this imputable remunerative limit is an "extra" profit resulting from 
speculative actions or monopolistic power. Consequently, decreasing prices would reflect 
the fact that higher initial prices include these "extra" profits 1nade possible by 
monopolistic appropriation of technology, and that they drop to the level of "normal" 
profits when the firm launches a better product, when the enterprise feels that there is 
sufficient market to expand profits, no longer through "extra" profits per product sold 
but rather by an increase in total profits through a higher volume of sales, or 
finally - when other firms have entered the market with similar products. 
Oligopoly theory distinguishes between two main types of oligopolistic 
situations: concentrated and differentiated oligopoly. In concentrated oligopolies 
there is a greater degree of concentration and firms produce relatively homogenous 
products, with a few firms controlling all or most of production. The technological 
advantages of production processes play a most important role in this case. In 
differentiated oligopolies there are numerous firms and each carves a "market niche" 
for itself by introducing variations in a product line that differentiate its own 
product from those of the competitors, and by stressing these real or apparent 
differences through advertising and marketing techniques. Consumer preferences play 
an important role and thus a new type of "barrier to entry" would appear: the level of 
investment in product sales (marketing, advertising, distribution, etc.) required to 
obtain an adequate clientele (89}. 
The predominance of oligopolies is also linked to the worldwide expansion of 
manufacturing industry. Sylas Labini summarizes the situation as follows: 
"In brief, modern capitalism is characterized in many important branches by a 
process of expansion in the size of a relatively decreasing number of firms; the main 
conditioning factor of such a process is technical progress. Such a process, helped by 
that particular progress taking place in the means of transportation, has surpassed 
national boundaries to embrace first whole countries and, in certain branches, a good 
part of the world" (90}. 
Oligopolies are considered inevitable in developing countries because of the 
limited size of their markets and the relatively large scale of output required for 
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efficient production with modern technology. Thus Merhav (91) argues that "underdeveloped 
countries depend for their growth on the techniques of advanced countries, and the 
consequences of the scale of output determined in the latter on the competitive structure 
of the former result are immediately obvious: Their limited markets cannot support but 
a few firms in each branch of production." Therefore, the main findings of oligopoly 
theory are seen to apply to developing countries, although several important 
modifications have been introduced to take into account their condition of dependence, 
and in particular the fact that the spread of multinational corporations and the 
dependence on foreign technology significantly alter the nature of these "peripheral 
oligopolies." 
For example, Sylas Labini points out the accentuated social implications of the 
rise of oligopolies and of technical progress for the developing countries: 
''. .. 'The oligopolistic 111?chanism' of the distribution of the fruits of technical 
progress (increase in money incomes rather than price reduction) and the different kinds 
of scale economies give rise to 'privileged firms' and to 'privileged industries,' where 
the privileges concern both capitalists and workers. In backward countries the said 
mechanism gives rise to privileged 'social enclaves' which need political protection and 
have important political implications" (92). 
Sercovich (93) has shown the various ways in which the technological advantages 
associated with the barriers to entry imposed by the leading oligopolistic firms are 
exploited in the peripheral countries. These firms recreate the oligopolistic structures 
prevailing in their original markets through the establishment of subsidiaries and the 
granting of licenses to local manufacturers. Tavares (94) has introduced the concept 
of "competitive oligopoly" to describe new forms of competitive behaviour found in 
Brazilian industry that departed significantly from the form of competition prevailing 
in concentrated and differentiated oligopolies. 
Another line of thought in oligopoly theory postulates that product 
differentiation - a characteristic of differentiated oligopoly - frequently imposes the 
need for different technologies, and that there are few techniques actually available 
for the production of a given commodity at a particular scale of output. Thus Merhav {95) 
and Sylos Labini (96) both emphasize the importance of the selection of the commodities 
to be produced, rather than the problem associated with the choice of techniques, 
considering that the latter is largely a by-product of the former. This leads Sylos 
Labini to propose: 
"If the problem of the choice of techniques is largely conditioned by that of 
the choice of the kind of commodities to be produced and their scale of production, then 
it is wrong for an underdeveloped country to adopt a policy of economic growth which 
gives priority by means of incentives of various kinds designed to influence the decision 
of the managers, to the problem of the choice of techniques .... it is necessary first of 
all to choose the kind of commodities the production of which is to be promoted and only 
subordinately to decide the type of incentives to be introduced to stimulate the adoption 
of more or less labour-intensive techniques when this choice is really possible" (97). 
A recent article by Fajnzylber (98) introduces some additional modifications to 
oligopoly theory to make it more relevant to the situation of Latin American countries. 
Based on an extensive empirical survey of the operation of multinational enterprises in 
the Mexican economy, he points out that in many cases there appears to be a wide range 
of technical options with regard to the scale of production, adding also that there is 
the economic possibility of using part of the installed capacity without affecting the 
competitive position of the firm in the internal market. This last argument is also 
applicable to oligopolies in the central countries (an unused capacity reserve is seen 
as one of the mechanisms for keeping potential new competitors out of the market), but 
it acquires special dimensions in the small and excessively protected markets of the 
less developed countries. 
But Fajnzylber's main criticism refers to the notion of "barriers to entry." 
He points out that the factors that constitute the oligopolistic barriers to entry do 
not exist for the subsidiaries of multinational corporations that try to penetrate 
established industrial markets in the Latin American economies. These corporations 
have already surmounted the barriers to entry in their own original and more competitive 
markets, and the investment required to operate in the peripheral countries represents 
a marginal sum in comparison with the total financial resources at their disposal. 
Therefore the newcoming subsidiaries can confront, possibly during a long period of time, 
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an eventual price and advertising war waged by the subsidiaries already established. This 
would make the established firms incapable of stopping the incorporation of new firms, 
leading to the paradox that in the small peripheral markets it is pos~ible to find a 
larger number of firms operating than in the original markets of the multinational 
corporations. This situation would be found primarily in differentiated oligopolies. 
On the other hand, these "barriers to entry" become an impenetrable wall when 
the aspiring entrants are local private enterprises (state enterprises can surmount these 
barriers due to administrative government decisions to reserve markets in exclusivity, 
establish joint ventures, etc.). Lack of financial, marketing, administrative, and 
technical capabilities would make it almost impossible for a local firm on its own to 
enter a new market where subsidiaries of multinational corporations dominate unless some 
form of alliance (e.g., through licensing agreements) is forged with another 
multinational. 
The implications of the transfer of oligopolistic market structures for income 
distribution, concentration and denationalization of production, employment, and 
allocation of resources are also examined by Fajnzylber, who points out that this 
replication of oligopolistic structures does not have any positive effect on technical 
progress in the peripheral countries: 
" ... oligopolistic structures are effectively transferred to the recipient 
countries, although at an inferior level of efficiency, the high rates of profitability 
are also reproduced locally, but what does not appear is the process of technological 
innovation generated locally. This omission does not prevent that part of the profits 
generated locally be allocated to pay for the expenditures on technological innovation 
activities made in the country of origin. 
"In short, while in their country of origin the leading enterprises in 
oligopolistic structures generate the process of technological innovation, in Latin 
America the leading enterprises in local oligopolistic structures, subsidiaries of the 
first, utilize and with that amortize the expenditures in research made a few years 
before in the respective country of origin" (99). 
TECHNOLOGY AND CAPITAL ACCUMULATION AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 
Starting with the Marxist critique of capitalist production and the place of 
technology in it, a theoretical body has been developed that links the process of 
capital accumulation and its international expansion with the nature and impact of 
technical progress. 
Because the roots of this school of thought are found in the writings of Marx, 
it is interesting to summarize briefly some of Marx's own conceptions of the relations 
between technology and economic growth. 
Marx and Technology 
Marx considered that technological and economic processes are closely interwoven 
and that they affect each other in many ways. According to Rosenberg, "rather than 
positing some unidirectional chain of causation for technological change, Marx offers 
a far richer mode of analysis, one which emphasizes the mutual interactions and feedbacks 
between economy and technology" (100); thus Marx rejected both the extreme view of 
technological determinism and that of economic factors linearly determining the course 
of events in technical progress. 
For Marx, technology is at the centre of those activities that are distinctly 
human. "The simple elements of the labour process are 1) purposeful activity, that is 
work itself, 2) the object on which the work is performed, and 3) the instruments of 
that work" (101). Thus, if technology is considered as human knowledge put at the 
service of production (or the labour process), it appears in the instruments for work, 
in the "purposeful activity," which presupposes an initial conception and design of the 
work to be realized, and also in the object of work, which would incorporate human 
knowledge as a result. In a broader sense, Marx considers that technology is what 
mediates between man and his relationship with the external material world. 
The transition from artisan work to manufacturing and then to large-scale 
modern industry, with the associated changes in the way the labour process is organized 
under capitalism, was one of the key issues on which Marx focused with regard to 
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technology. Manufacturing was considered as an extension of handicraft, where instead of 
one artisan performing a whole range of operations in the production of a single 
commodity, the process was broken into a series of discrete steps each of which was 
assigned to a different worker. Nevertheless, this growing specialization which had 
many consequences that were the subject of Marx's careful attention - shared a common 
feature with the medieval handicraft system: a continued reliance upon human skills and 
capacities. 
Large-scale modern industry represented a radical break in the history of 
capitalism. For the first time production did not have to rely on human skills as 
applied directly to the productive process, but rather was mediated by machines in the 
sense that large-scale industry took over the production of machines, which were then 
used in the production of other corrrnodities. This allowed the fusion of modern 
scientific and technical knowledge - which was incorporated into the production of 
machines - with productive activities, which now could be carried out at a greater speed, 
with greater accuracy, mobilizing nature's forces, and with the worker playing the role 
of a controller or supervisor rather than a direct intervener in the process itself (102). 
According to Rosenberg: 
"The decisive step was the development of a machine technology which was not 
heavily dependent upon human skills or volitions, where the production process was 
broken down into a series of separately analyzable steps. The historic importance of 
Modern Industry was that it incorporated these separate steps into machine processes to 
which scientific knowledge and principles could now be routinely applied ... when this 
stage has been reached, Marx argues, technology becomes, for the first time, capable of 
indefinite improvement" ( 103). 
The trends toward international expansion and large-scale production, which 
characterize contemporary "big industry," were clearly anticipated by Marx. 
Improvements in transportation and communications were seen to follow the advent of 
modern large-scale industry: " ... the means of communication handed down from the period 
of manufacture soon became unbearable fetters on large-scale industry, given the 
feverish velocity with which it produces, its enormous extent, its constant flinging of 
capital and labour from one sphere of production into another and its newly created 
connections with the world market. Hence ... the means of communication and transport 
gradually adapted themselves to the mode of production of large-scale industry" (104). 
Innovations in this field were also forms of reducing the time of circulation of capital. 
Large-scale production led to the possibilities of exploiting economies of scale, of 
introducing measures to utilize by-products, and of introducing capital-saving 
innovations, particularly when technological change reaches the machine-producing sector. 
All of these considerations led Marx to attach great importance to the capital goods 
sector of modern industry. 
Finally, Marx viewed the evolution and interaction of technology and production 
in a dynamic way: 
"Modern industry never views or treats the existing form of a production process 
as the definitive one. Its technical base is therefore revolutionary, whereas all 
earlier modes of production were essentially conservative. By means of machinery, 
chemical processes and other methods, it is continually transforming not only the 
technical basis of production but also the functions of the worker and the social 
combinations of the 1 abour process" ( 105). 
Technology and Capitalist Production 
In this school of thought capitalist production implies the generalized 
production of commodities. The organization of economic and social life is so imbued 
with capitalist production views that relationships among men become hidden and 
metamorphosed as if they were relationships among things (commodities}. The value of a 
commodity (both exchange value and use value) depends on the way men have organized to 
produce it, and therefore it incorporates a historically specific social relationship 
and a mode of production. 
As human knowledge applied to capitalist production, technology acquires the 
nature of a commodity. Technology becomes impregnated with the social relationships 
implied in capitalism, and its development is determined by these relationships. 
Capitalist production is also the production of surplus value. Surplus value 
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is the expression of a social organization of production which, on th~ one hand, has the 
owners of the means of production (capitalists) who decide what, how: and for whom to 
produce, and, on the other, has those who have only their work to sell (workers). 
Surplus value arises because the capitalist does not compensate the worker for all the 
time he has dedicated to his work, but pays only a part equivalent to that fraction of 
working time necessary to reproduce the work force. The rest of the time the worker is 
producing surplus value to the benefit of the capitalist. This surplus value allows the 
capitalist to increase the amount of money that he initially invested in production and, 
through this accumulation, allows him to reproduce his condition of owner of the means 
of production and the material conditions for the production that operates to his benefit. 
This accumulated surplus value is transformed into capital'. Thus, the social capital/ 
labour relationship defines the capitalist mode of production, and its antagonistic 
nature supports and determines the contradictory development of the system. 
The need to accumulate surplus value and capital leads the capitalist to speed 
up the concentration of workers and means of production (the latter to a progressively 
higher proportion than the former) under his power for purposes of reducing his 
production costs and hence increasing his profits. Capitalist production thus carries 
with it the concentration and centralization of capital, that is, larger volumes of 
capital that require broader markets for their realization. This arises in conjunction 
with the emergence of large-scale modern industry. 
Consequently, capitalist production is also the reproduction of capital as a 
social relationship. To this end, the capitalist must unceasingly accumulate surplus 
value. Since a working day has physical and psychological limits, the method used to 
increase surplus value consists of decreasing the working time socially necessary for 
the reproduction of the work force. Since the capitalist cannot reduce the monetary 
remuneration as he wishes, the route he usually follows is to introduce social and 
technical changes that increase the productivity of labour, so that labour will produce 
more in less tirre and thus reduce the value of the labour incorporated into the 
commodities, as well as the cost of materials and of the means of production. Thus 
technical progress is one way in which the capitalist may increase the surplus value 
under his control; this allows him to reduce the value of the labour force and thus to 
counter the essential antagonism that sets him in opposition to the worker. 
Marx pointed out the absolute contradiction between the revolutionary technical 
basis of modern large-scale industry and the form it takes under capitalism, with the 
capitalist extracting the surplus value from the workers: 
" ... large scale industry, by its very nature, necessitates variation of labour, 
fluidity of functions, and mobility of the worker in all directions. But ... in its 
capitalist form it reproduces the old division of labour with its ossified 
particularities ... This absolute contradiction does away with all repose, all fixity and 
all security as far as the worker's life situation is concerned; how it constantly 
threatens, by taking away the instruments of labour, to snatch from his hands the means 
of subsistence, and, by supressing his specialized function, to make him superfluous" 
(106). 
The processes of concentration of the means of production and centralization of 
capitals (107) imply the development of productive forces and the progressive 
socialization of labour and the means of production. This is the historical role played 
by capitalism and is at the root of its contradictory nature: the socialization of 
production becomes increasingly in conflict with the private appropriation of the means 
of production and the extraction of surplus value. This central contradiction of 
capitalism, viewed from the perspective of technology, can be expressed in the following 
terms: the process of capital accumulation and the drive for profits both accelerate 
technological development and at the same time hinder it. On the one hand, technical 
progress - which in the context of capitalism tends to reduce the value of labour 
incorporated into production - supports the process of accumulation by augmenting 
labour productivity through the application of science to technology and then to 
production. On the other hand, technical progress hinders the process of capital 
accumulation for it constantly increases that part of capital that is required for the 
means of production (fixed assets) in relation to that which is required to employ the 
means of production (labour) (108). Therefore, as a result of technical progress, 
larger amounts of capital will increasingly be required to maintain a constant rate of 
profits, and the capitalist will be forced to allocate an ever-increasing proportion of 
his profits to investment in the means of production. 
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In most cases technical progress under capitalism implies a decrease in the use 
of the labour force and an increase in the use of machinery, equipment, and materials 
(e.g., mechanization, automation). Therefore, the result of this type of technical 
progress is an increase in the organic and technical composition of capital. The ratio 
of surplus value to variable capital would also increase for the same reason, but a limit 
would arise because the capitalist cannot reduce real wages at his discretion,especially 
in societies where salaries are relatively high and trade unions well organized, and 
because he cannot raise prices indefinitely due to competition, or if he is in a 
monopolistic situation, due to demand elasticities. Consequently, there is a trend for 
the organic composition of capital to increase to a larger extent than the ratio of 
surplus value to variable capital, producing a decline in the profit rate as a result. 
The efforts to resolve these two contradictory tendencies lie at the heart of 
the relation between technical progress and the process of capitalist accumulation. The 
declining trend of the profit rate in the long run is the result of opposing forces that 
are permanently struggling against each other. Capitalists, in their quest to increase 
profits, unleash a complex of forces and mechanisms that result in a general decline in 
the profit rate (109). 
One of the ways of suppressing this contradiction without changing the basic 
exploitative nature of capitalism has been to slow down the rate of technical progress, 
limiting the introduction of innovations that would reduce drastically the value of 
labour incorporated into production. The gradual shift of more advanced techniques from 
industrialized to nonindustrialized countries - with lower wage rates - is seen as a way 
of achieving this, as is the promotion of labour-intensive techniques (110). Finally, 
the expansion of the capitalist system to other areas where it has not yet been fully 
extended is also seen as a way of halting temporarily the inexorable trend of declining 
profit rates under capitalism. 
The efforts to fight against this decline require an increased concentration 
of the means of production, leading to ever-larger scales of production, and an increased 
centralization of capitals, so that they can be allocated more "efficiently" to stave off 
the declining trend of profit rates. Thus a transition from competitive to monopolistic 
capitalism emerges, and this took place in the last decades of the 19th century and the 
early decades of the 20th century (111). 
Imperialism and International Economics: The Market Question 
The expansion of capitalism at an international level through commercial, 
financial, and technological networks must be understood as arising out of its main 
contradictions. The configuration of an international economy dominated by the 
capitalist mode of production is the result of the processes of capital concentration 
and centralization - which imply the internationalization of productive structures and 
the establishment of oligopolistic and monopolistic markets at the international level -
and of the attempts of capitalists to overcome the tendency for the rate of profits to 
decline. 
Since their origin as capitalist economies, Western industrialized countries 
have faced the problem of realization of the surplus generated by the industrial sector. 
In these economies, even though agriculture served as a support for industrialization, 
the relative scarcity of agricultural surplus made it impossible to create an internal 
market sufficiently large to absorb and utilize the whole industrial surplus in the 
early stages of the development of capitalism. 
Exporting part of the surplus was then a way of speeding up the growth of the 
industrial sector in these economies. In fact, the existence of foreign markets was an 
incentive to increase the productivity of industrial labour and with it, national income 
and production. As capital accumulation and industrialization progressed in the central 
countries, it became necessary to increase imports of agricultural commodities and raw 
materials from the periphery, which, involving much lower production costs, made it 
possible to cheapen (relatively) the labour force and to depress the value of the 
elements of constant capital in central countries, and thus to counter the decline in 
profit rates and support accumulation. 
Thus the development of capitalism posed from the beginning the problem of 
unequal development between agriculture and industry and hence of countries specializing 
in one or the other of these types of products. Concurrently, the international 
expansion of capitalism, and specifically the role of exports and imports, was prompted 
by the need to realize surplus, reducing the costs and supporting profit rates. 
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The existence of foreign markets made it possible for capital to move toward regions 
where profit rates were higher. 
Thus an international division of labour was established between countries 
exporting mainly primary goods and countries mainly producing manufactured goods. This 
division of labour maintained and increased the subordination of the first to the second 
group of countries, leading to the exploitation of the developing countries for the 
benefit of the dominating nations (either directly, by lowering the value of the constant 
and variable elements that make up the profit rate of the central countries, or 
indirectly, by generating very high profit rates in the periphery, which consequently 
increased the centre's average profit rate). The peripheral countries' role as consumer 
of the surplus generated was not significant because of the narrowness of their domestic 
markets. Their basic role was to support the industrializa~ion of the central countries. 
When capital concentration and centralization lead to an accumulation of surplus 
in the centre to such an extent that part of it can no longer be reinvested in the centre 
for it would further depress the profit rate, then the transfer of some industrial 
activities to the periphery starts as a gradual systematic process going beyond the 
simple establishment of exporting enclaves to exploit natural resources. Capitals are 
extensively exported in the form of money and products and the peripheral industrial and 
financial sectors flourish. This process was particularly sharpened after World War II, 
when the world monetary system opened a large expansionary wave that lasted until 1971. 
The surplus generation-realization contradiction, which reflects the 
contradictory phenomena of capitalist production, is internal to the capitalist mode of 
production (112). The concrete way capitalists attempt to resolve this contradiction 
determines, in each specific and temporary situation, the size and dimensions of the 
market served by the capitalist mode of production, whose expansion tends to capture or 
destruct precapitalist modes of production, as well as to reallocate productive factors 
and resources to industry, to the detriment of the rural areas. 
The profit motive, and capital concentration and centralization (and hence the 
monopolistic control of technological innovation), translate into a trend toward 
imbalanced and disproportionate growth among the different productive sectors of 
capitalist activity. This complicates the problem of surplus realization and encourages 
the search for solutions beyond the confines where the capitalist mode is already fully 
operative (113). According to the specializations imposed by the international division 
of labour, and according to the type of technological progress that supports each 
productive activity, it would be possible to infer whether this disproportionate sectoral 
growth will ratify or modify the degree of regional, national, or international unequal 
development. Internationalization of certain productive activities is, at the same time, 
a way of balancing the negative effects that this sectoral lack of proportion has on the 
profit rate, as well as a way of reproducing it in the periphery. 
Science and technology are now becoming increasingly important for the 
accelerated generation of surplus and for its disposal. It has been pointed out that 
"the international centres which produce modern technology present themselves, in 
relation to the control of capitals, as 'vortices' which subordinate large masses of 
capitals previously dispersed in their autonomy" (114). The oil-producing countries, 
which by themselves are unable to employ the large sums of money they have been able 
to extract since the rise in oil prices, are an example of this. 
Su11111arizing: science and technology, which were used intensively to support 
production since the beginnings of capitalism - when handicraft production was transformed 
into manufacturing and later into modern large-scale industry - also helped in expanding 
the sphere of capital circulation and in defending profits in opposition to the rise in 
wages, thus providing a basis for capitalist accumulation. In the imperialistic stage, 
science and technology are further transformed into means for the extraction of surplus 
and its transfer from the dominated to the imperialistic countries. As such, technology 
greatly accelerates the rate of capital accumulation and for the same reason renews 
constantly, and at higher levels, the problems of absorption and utilization of the 
surplus, thus reinforcing the overall tendency for profit rates to decline. 
VIEWS ON TECHNICAL CHANGE AT THE FIRM LEVEL 
Most studies of technical change at the firm level, both theoretical and 
empirical, use the general framework of neoclassical theory and have been carried out in 
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the Western industrialized countries. In their survey of the literature Kennedy and 
Thirlwall (115) identify two approaches to the study of technical progress: the first 
focuses on the economic effects of changes in technology, primarily at the aggregate 
level, and the second focuses on technical change itself and its conditioning factors. 
The preceding review of schools of thought on technology, development, and 
industrialization covered some of the issues raised by economists who follow the first 
approach; therefore the following sections will deal briefly with technical change at 
the firm level and its determinants. 
According to standard economic theory, the sequence of activities involved in 
the process of technical change starts with the performance of research and deve l ocment 
(R&D), leading to invention and then to innovation. The studies of research and 
development activities in industry examine the growth of expenditures, the rates of 
return to investment in R&D, the nature of R&D tasks, the impact of R&D in the 
generation of new knowledge, and the determinants of R&D performance. Particular 
attention has been given to the relation between the size of firms and the amount of 
R&D activity, although findings are not conclusive with regard to whether increases in 
firm size lead to proportionate increases in R&D activities. The same can be said about 
the relationship between the amount of research and industrial concentration (116). 
With regard to the problem of invention, which is defined as "the devising of 
new ways of attaining given ends," it is possible to identify three schools of thought 
(117). The first adheres to the "heroic" theory of inventions, which gives preeminence 
to the individual genius and his intuition and foresight; the second espouses the 
"cumulative synthesis" point of view, according to which basic inventions arise 
inevitably as a result of the accumulation and integration of minor changes and 
inventions; and the third postulates a "mechanistic" view, which stresses that invention 
arises as a response to concrete needs, particularly of an economic nature ("necessity 
is the mother of invention"). Evidence shows that the heroic mode of invention is 
becoming less and less frequent in today's industrial world, where organized research 
plays a dominant role in invention. Evidence is less conclusive regarding the other two 
schools of thought. 
The process of innovation, which is defined as the commercial application of 
inventions for the first time, has been more widely studied and will be examined below 
in more detail. 
The diffusion of innovations has received substantial attention in the 
literature on the economics of technical change. A recent study summarizes earlier 
findings and presents the results attained in an international research project involving 
six Western European countries and covering ten processes (118). The study attempted to 
assess the scope and extent of diffusion of the chosen processes, identify the factors 
that speed up their diffusion, and account for the differences encountered between 
countries. However, these studies focused primarily on the technical nature of the 
innovation and on the characteristics of the enterprises whose individual decisions to 
choose the technique under study, at different points in time, gave rise to the 
phenomenon of diffusion. By and large these studies left out the structural 
characteristics (at the national and international levels) of the industrial branch where 
the innovation took place. Studies carried out in Brazil addressed these issues and 
tried first to examine the characteristics of the industrial structure and to relate the 
findings on diffusion of innovations to it. This required a selective return to some 
Schumpeteri an concepts of i nnovati ·Jn, which treat technol ogi cal change as an instrument 
of capitalist competition (119). 
However, Rosenberg has recently criticized the traditional approach, which 
distinguishes sharply between the processes of invention, innovation, and diffusion. 
In his view, these distinctions - which are a legacy from Schumpeter's conceptualization 
of innovation - have distracted attention from the gradual and minor changes that take 
place in technology at the plant level, which although less dramatic than the major 
innovations that have received preferential attention by economists, are nevertheless 
a most important source of technological improvements. Rosenberg concludes: 
" ... our dominant conceptualization of innovation has, in many basic respects, 
served to obscure rather than to illuminate the process of technological innovation. 
It has done this by creating artificial conceptual disjunctions between innovative 
activity and other activities with which it is not only linked, but which in fact 
constitute major parts of the historical process of innovation itself. It has done this 
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primarily by employing concepts which do not explicitly recognize the role of patterns 
of events at the technological level. As a result, 1) we confine our thinking about 
innovations to features and characteristics which are likely to be true only of major 
innovations, 2) we focus disproportionately upon discontinuities and neglect continuities 
in the innovative process, 3) we attach excessive importance to the role of scientific 
knowledge and insufficient importance to engineering and other 'lower' forms of knowledge, 
and 4) we attach excessive significance to early stages in the process of invention and 
neglect the crucial later stages" (120). 
The Process of Innovation and its Determinants 
The process of innovation at the enterprise level and the factors that influence 
it have received greater attention during the last fifteen· years after a relatively long 
period of neglect (Schumpeter in the late 1920's was the last to treat these issues in 
detail in economic theory until the present wave of studies began in the late 1950's). 
In spite of substantial results from empirical research (121), the evidence in 
favour of most propositions on technological innovaticn remains inconclusive, and much 
more research will be required before anything definitive can be said about the process 
of technological innovation and its determinants. Nevertheless, some hypotheses and 
postulates appear more plausible than others in view of their logical construction and 
the relative amount of evidence supporting them. 
Pavitt summarizes the situation with regard to factors influencing the success 
of innovation as follows: 
"No uni versa 1 recipe can be written which wil 1 increase the chances of 
successful innovation in all firms, in all industries, of all sizes and at all times. 
Nevertheless, one can at least identify the factors that are likely to influence the 
firm's activities in relation to industrial innovation. One of these factors is internal 
to the firm, namely its strategy towards industrial innovation. Other factors are 
external to the firm: first, the nature and scope of opportunities open to the firm for 
enhancing its technology as part of its search for profits and efficiency; second, the 
size of the firm; third, the nature and degree of market competition that the firm is 
facing; and fourth, the general economic environment in which the firm is working, 
especially insofar as this environment influences the resources, incentives and rewards 
for innovative activities" (122). 
Freeman (123) has proposed a classification of innovation strategies for a firm 
that takes into consideration issues such as the firm's performance of fundamental 
research, applied research, experimental development, design engineering, technical 
services, scientific and technical information, and so on. 
The "offensive" strategy is designed to achieve technical and market leadership 
by being ahead of competitors in the introduction of new products and processes, which 
requires strong in-house activities in science and technology. The "defensive" 
strategy aims at not being left behind by competitors rather than at being first in the 
world, and still requires a substantial in-house scientific and technological effort. 
The "imitative" strategy involves the deliberate imitation of innovations developed 
e 1 sew here, often through the purchase of 1 i censes and know-how from an "offensive" or 
"defensive" innovator. The "dependent" strategy involves the acceptance of an 
essentially subordinate role in relation to other stronger firms. The "traditional" 
strategy involves little or no innovation in products and processes, because the market 
does not demand innovation or competition does not compel it. Finally, the "opportunist" 
strategy involves identifying and exploiting a niche not requiring in-house scientific 
and technical capabilities. 
The adoption of a particular strategy, or mix of strategies in large 
diversified firms, has important implications for the performance of scientific and 
technological activities within the firm. Problems such as the minimum critical size 
for R&D efforts arise, for there is evidence that a particular level of investment is 
required by an innovating firm before it reaches a threshold beyond which it is able to 
exploit scientific advances. Townsed (124) considered that British firms required a 
minimum of b20,000 per researcher in 1973 and that at least five researchers would be 
required to form a viable team. Considering that 2% of sales would be an adequate figure 
to spend on research, he concluded that only firms with more than b5 million would be 
able to engage actively in research and development at the minimum level (which may only 
32 
guarantee capabilities for an imitative strategy). 
Regarding factors external to the firm, the opportunities to enhance technology 
through devising and introducing new products and processes will vary considerably from 
industry to industry, depending on the characteristics of the technology itself, on 
market receptivity, and on the extent to which suppliers of machinery, materials, and 
components are engaged actively in innovation. Thus the first three strategies 
(offensive, defensive, imitative) are identified with research-intensive industries, 
where technological change plays a very important role in competition, whereas the 
traditional and dependent strategies are associated with industries in which technological 
change does not play a major role. Not only the opportunities but also the ways in which 
technological capabilities can be enhanced will vary according to the particular branch 
of industry being considered. Depending on the nature of the technology involved, 
improvements may be effected through licensing agreements, investments in fixed assets, 
changes in product design, and so forth (125). 
The nature of competition has a direct and considerable influence on the 
pressures for industrial firms to innovate, as well as on the types of innovations that 
are introduced and the rewards they bring. The structure of the market in which the firm 
operates, particularly the degree of industrial concentration and monopoly power, has 
been considered by some economists as one of the main determinants of innovative 
behaviour. This is closely associated with the arguments concerning the relationship 
between size of firm and innovation. On the one hand, it is argued that since 
innovations are costly and risky, a high degree of monopoly (closely associated with 
large enterprises) is essential for innovation, since this creates the organizational 
slack and provides the financial resources, the minimum threshold, and the degree of 
market certainty that are required for innovations to be successful. On the other hand, 
it is argued that concentration and monopoly power decrease the incentives to innovate, 
generate a rigid, risk-averting attitude, and stifle inventiveness under a bureaucratic 
shell, primarily because it is possible to maintain high profits without innovating. 
In their review of the literature Kennedy and Thirlwall conclude: 
"The evidence appears to be heavily weighted against the hypothesis that a 
necessary condition for technological change and progressiveness is that firms should be 
large scale and dominate the market in which they operate. From the very origins of 
technical change, in the work that is put into research, to the commercial application 
of new knowledge, it does not appear that large firms or monopolistic industries are 
necessarily more dynamic or progressive, or produce more fundamental technical advance. 
After a certain threshold size there is even evidence that R&D activity and the number 
of patents issued appear to increase less than proportionately with size. Moreover, 
there is some evidence that it is not always the largest firms that innovate the quickest 
despite their presumably more favrurab le access to resources. Large firms by no means 
have a monopoly on fundamental changes either. Major technological breakthroughs come 
from a variety of sources" (126). 
The general economic environment also influences innovative activities, 
particularly through the structure of rewards to innovating firms. For example, in 
periods of economic decline or stagnation, research and development expenditures are 
usually among the first to be cut. 
However, it may also be the case that an unfavourable environment may force some 
changes in organization and attitudes within the firm, leading to technical changes and 
innovation as a way of improving performance. Considering other economic factors, the 
prevalence of relatively high interest and inflation rates would bias the firm in favour 
of short-term and safe R&D projects that can produce quick returns on investment, leaving 
aside the longer-term, more risky, and potentially more rewarding ones. Taxation, 
incentives, subsidies, and other government intervention measures (policy instruments) 
would also have an important impact, although they have not been studied in sufficient 
detail to provide any conclusive evidence (127). 
Endogenous Views on Technical Change 
A series of both empirical and theoretical efforts have been made during the 
last fifteen years toward the development of an "endogenous" view of technical change 
(128). These efforts grew following realization of the difficulties involved in 
explaining technical change in terms of traditional economic theory. Complaints in this 
respect focused upon two major aspects: (a) the relevance of inducement mechanisms 
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concerning factor-saving bias, and (b) the assimilation of technical change with shifts 
in the production function (129). 
Salter, among others, questioned Hicks's assertion according to which ''a change 
in the relative prices of factors of production is itself a spur to invention, and to 
invention of a particular kind - directed to economizing the use of a factor which has 
become relatively expensive" (130). Salter cogently argued that under competitive 
conditions, the individual firm is simply not interested in the particular factor-saving 
bias of technical improvement (131). 
The assimilation of technical change to shifts in the production function has 
also been subject to strong criticisms. The assumptions of continuous isoquants over the 
whole range of production possibilities and of readily available alternative techniques 
at zero costs were also considered highly artificial. InsOfar as eligible techniques 
under varied economic conditions imply an expensive and uncertain search process, the 
distinction between movements along the production possibilities frontier and shifts in 
such a frontier may be inadequate. Later developments along neoclassical lines, i.e., 
the concept of the innovative possibilities frontier or that of a "fundamental production 
function," did little to improve the explanatory value of received theory, since the 
basic assumptions remained unaltered (132). 
Hence, efforts toward the explanation of technical change adopted new directions, 
giving rise to new concepts and avenues for research. These proved to be useful in the 
treatment of other aspects - previously separated from technological factors - such as 
(a) accounting for the timing of innovations; (b) finding linkages between specific 
innovations and the resulting growth in resource productivity; and (c) accounting for 
both the rate and the direction of diffusion of innovations throughout the economy. 
The following main features of these new avenues of thought can be singled out: 
a departure from the Schumpeterian concept of innovation with its emphasis on ''major" 
technical changes; a distinction between the introductory stage of an innovation and 
the subsequent stage of diffusion involving modifications and improvements to the 
original innovation; the development of concepts regarding the process of technological 
learning; the introduction of the idea of localized innovation; and, more generally, the 
adoption of a "heuristic" approach to innovation. 
Against an intellectual background biased toward innovations involving 
breakthroughs based on scientific knowledge that purports to be of the widest degree of 
generality, a number of empirical studies have shown conclusively the importance of minor 
innovations (133). These involve any nontrivial change in processes and products and 
consist of "mere" technological or engineering knowledge of a speci fie and particular 
nature. 
Whereas the introductory stage of an innovation (first usage at the commercial 
level) involves cost reductions with regard to previous "best-practice" techniques, 
subsequent enhancements - largely through nonroutine intramural engineering efforts, 
but also by engineering design firms - often involve relatively more important steps in 
the cost-reducing direction. In fact, the diffusion process is not looked upon as a 
mere adoption of an innovation by an increasing number of firms but as a cumulative 
process of improver1ent and adaptation belonging to the postintroductory phase of an 
innovation. Thus, the inventive activity is described as a gradual process of accretion 
where in genera·1 continuities are much more important than discontinuities. 
In this way, the postintroductory stage of technology enhancement is seen not 
as closing the invention stage but as inaugurating a learning period. This period has 
been researched by resorting to technological "learning by doing" and "learning by 
spending" models. Even though these approachEs may be thought to be not yet fully 
developed and have received some criticisms (134),they seem to open promising research 
perspectives and have already borne considerable fruits at both theoretical and empirical 
levels. 
The main output resulting from incremental technological learning, both at the 
plant and at the engineering design firm levels, is minor innovations sharing the nature 
of localized technical change. When firms undertake innovational activities, they 
usually have their own "technological frontier," which is strongly influenced by the 
initial design conditions of the technology they currently use (thus emphasizing the 
"putty-clay" character of technical knowledge). They do not explore along the whole 
production possibilities surface but only examine those points more directly relevant to 
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them, thereby generating "localized" innovations which affect only a particular process. 
These innovations are highly appropriable and involve changes in the shape of the 
production surface rather than shifts in it. At the same time certain "compulsive 
sequences" at the microeconomic level are involved, and firms will or'ient their search 
in the direction of the most compelling and obvious solutions to their technical 
adaptation problems. This orientation may be insensitive to a considerable range of 
changes in the values of macroeconomic variables. The consideration of these 
circumstances leads to the formulation of a microeconomic approach to technical change 
in terms of a "bottleneck analysis," which overcomes the customary disregard concerning 
day-to-day problems posed by the existing technology. 
Tech.r:i_ical Change and Innovation in Les~_[)~veloped CountrJ.~. 
Relatively little work has been done on the nature of, and the factors 
influencing, technical change at the firm level in the less developed countries. Among 
the few studies that can be identified, Katz (135) has examined the impact of scientific 
and technical activities on the rates of growth in Argentinian industry, finding that the 
learning process involved in actual production, and the technological activities not 
properly belonging to the field of "research and development" (adaptation of techniques, 
plant improvement, repair and maintenance, quality control, etc.), have an important 
influence on the growth of productivity. Several Indian studies have also covered some 
aspects of the process of innovation at the firm level, such as the performance of 
research and development and the impact of innovations on industrial growth (136). 
Another group of studies has examined managerial attitudes toward innovations (137),while 
others focus on products, characteristics, and the nature of the process (138). 
However, almost without exception, the studies of technological innovation in 
less developed countries that attempt to go beyond descriptive analysis borrow and adapt 
concepts and theories put forward in developed countries. Economic studies of innovation 
and its effects on rates of growth use the instruments of the neoclassical school, while 
the studies of entrepreneuri a 1 attitudes toward innovation are genera 1ly based on the 
conceptual framework of the functionalist school in sociology. 
Among the studies focusing on the determinants of technical change in the less 
developed countries is one carried out in Sao Paulo by a joint Brazilian-American team. 
The conceptual framework borrows from a model of the innovation process proposed by 
Utterback and Abernathy for the North American context (139). This model attempts to 
show that as a product matures, the mode of innovation shifts from radical product 
innovation, which is performance maximizing, to incremental innovation, which is cost 
minimizing, and process innovation increases in relative importance to product innovation. 
The model proposed by Utterback and Abernathy focuses on the dynamic evolution of the 
firm, following it from a fluid state, associated with the initial stages of product 
desi where radical modifications may be introduced in the innovation, to the specific 
, where the product is standardized and stable and the process of production more 
rigid, efficient, and based on economies of scale. A transition state is said to occur 
when the base for competition shifts from performance to cost. 
The model predicts that firms that are at different positions in the evolution 
of their product and process technology will respond to different stimuli, undertake 
different types of innovation, and thus confront different barriers to innovation. 
Following this rationale and using hypotheses derived from the model, the empirical phase 
of the study consisted of interviews with more than one hundred firms in the Sao Paulo 
area to examine their possible response to various mechanisms that would induce 
innovations (140). 
The problem with studies of technological innovation that borrow conceptual 
frameworks lies precisely in their adoption of models conceived for other situations. 
This adoption would imply ignoring the substantial contextual differences that exist 
for technical change and innovation. Acknowledging the heterogeneity of levels of 
industrialization in the developing world, some common characteristics will be 
highlighted to emphasize the difficulties in applying models conceived for other 
situations. 
First, the process of industrialization takes place in the general context of 
a dependent relationship with the countries that supply technological knowledge. The 
overwhelming majority of industrial innovations are not indigenous to the developing 
countries. They originate in the Western industrialized market economies and then are 
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transferred over a period usually extending from ten to twenty years. Therefore, models 
developed to explain and predict innovative behaviour indigenous to a firm, branch of 
industry, or country have little relevance to the situation in developing countries. 
Second, the size and characteristics of the markets in less developed countries 
differ widely from those in countries where innovations originate. The smallness of 
markets, the high degree of concentration of production, the predominance of foreign 
subsidiaries, the segmentation of markets, and the different types of firms participating 
in these markets (foreign, local, private, joint ventures, state) all combine to make 
most postulates and theories about technical change at the firm level irrelevant, 
particularly when they emphasize the proximity to markets and to suppliers of equipment 
and machinery as conditions for successful innovation. The markets of developing 
countries are not the original markets for which innovations are introduced, and their 
capital goods industry is (with the exception of the large semi-industrialized countries) 
usually incapable of providing the machinery and equipment required for tooling-up. 
Third, the structure and articulation of the industrial system needs to be taken 
into consideration explicitly. Studies on technical innovation in the developed countries 
take for granted the fact that the industrial system is well-organized and operates 
smoothly. However, the situation in most developing countries hardly corresponds to that 
of a well-integrated industrial structure where innovations in one branch - particularly 
capital goods, basic materials, and intermediate products - feed into other branches, 
creating a cumulative effect that helps other innovations to take place and diffuse. In 
consequence, it is not enough to pay attention to the characteristics of the innovating 
firm alone, and considerations regarding the way in which the firm and the branch to 
which it belongs are articulated with the rest of the industrial sector and the economy 
acquire paramount importance. 
Fourth, the characteristics of the firms themselves need to be considered in a 
different light. Most leading industrial firms in developing countries do not "evolve" 
from small to medium and then to large enterprises. They start large, often with excess 
capacity, usually as a result of foreign investment or some form of state intervention. 
Small local firms usually remain small in a subordinate position and seldom have the 
opportunity to grow, evolve, and challenge the leading enterprises in their respective 
branches. When the state intervenes directly as an entrepreneur, it concentrates mostly 
on large basic industries, where the scale of investment required is too large for local 
entrepreneurs and where foreign firms do not show interest. Because of scarcity of 
resources and government prestige, a general attitude of risk aversion not conducive to 
innovation is adopted. For all these reasons, it cannot be assumed that a general model 
of the innovation process will be adequate for such a variety of situations. Different 
types of enterprises will show different forms of rationality and this will condition 
their behaviour and attitudes toward technical change. 
Fifth, most of the economic literature on innovations, with the exceptions noted 
in the preceding section, focuses on "major" innovations and neglects the small 
adaptations and improvements that are the main sources of technical change in the 
developing countries. In the late 197D's there were efforts under way, both theoretical 
and empirical, to explore the characteristics of those "minor" innovations and to assess 
their impact on the less developed economies (141), but these have required substantial 
modifications to existing theories and the development of new concepts. 
Finally, the relatively high degree of government intervention in the conduct 
of economic and industrial affairs also alters the context in which firms operate in less 
developed countries. The incentives to innovate, the orientation of technical change, 
and the access to the sources of technical innovation for firms in developing countries 
will be influenced by government to a greater degree (even without their intending to 
do so) than for enterprises in developed countries. This, in turn, pushes the 
entrepreneurs in the direction of becoming political pressure groups, and to act beyond 
the strict limits of the firm becomes a necessary condition for the successful conduct of 
business. 
All of these considerations point out that the nature of the innovative 
activity in the developing countries differs substantially from that in the industrialized 
economies, and that the concepts, theories, and models of technological innovation 
postulated in the latter need to be examined critically and thoroughly before they are 
applied to the former. At present there are no totally coherent and original 
theoretical formulations of technical change for firms in developing economies, and 
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consequently there is a lack of relevant theoretical propositions or hypotheses to test 
at the empirical level. 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE DIFFERENT SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT 
The various schools of thought on technology, development, and industrialization 
(and their ramifications) constitute a very rich source of policy recommendations. Many 
government policies, with their corresponding policy instruments, have been devised and 
justified as deriving from a particular school of thought whose validity, both on 
theoretical and empirical grounds, was accepted by those in power. Ideological issues 
are also closely interwoven with the process of selecting a particular viewpoint from 
which to derive policy prescriptions for scientific and technological development, for 
the choice of a perspective is not value-free. 
Because of its high degree of development, conceptual elegance, and apparent 
ideological neutrality, the neoclassical school provides probably the most widely 
accepted conceptual framework for deriving policy implications with regard to science 
and technology. Behind the mathematical language of neoclassical economies there is a 
set of assumptions that are the real source of the policy recommendations. Thus, the 
assumption of marginal analysis, and those introduced by postulates and hypotheses such 
as the substitutability of factors, the divisibility of production, and the neutrality 
of technical change, provide the basis from which recommendations on the liberalization 
of international trade and the alignment of factor scarcities, among others, are based 
and propounded. 
However, as was pointed out in the preceding sections of this module,alternative 
viewpoints that challenge the postulates of the neoclassical school have acquired greater 
importance during the last three decades. The structuralist views proposed first by the 
U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America, the recent suggestions that derive from the 
dependency school of thought, and the implications of new developments in oligopoly 
theory all give rise to different policy prescriptions. Furthermore, there appears to 
be a trend toward convergence among these three schools of thought in the sense of 
viewing the phenomena of development and underdevelopment in an interrelated way and of 
awarding technical progress a central role in economic growth and the process of 
underdevelopment. It is likely that during the next few years a new synthesis will 
emerge, both from the point of view of interpreting reality and of proposing policy 
measures. The calls for a new international economic order, however vague they may 
appear at present, are beginning to provide a common ground for defining alternative 
perspectives to the problems of development and underdevelopment. 
All the schools of thought reviewed in this module share concern about the 
nature and impact of scientific and technical progress. The role of science and 
technology will become more and more important in the next few decades, for they will 
shape and condition the relations among countries. The new prominence that science and 
technology is acquiring has been underscored by many. For example, the negative impact 
of Europocentric science and the possibilities of obtaining "redemption through science" 
have been examined by Sachs (142); the need for a process of "technologization," which 
parallels that of industrialization, has been emphasized by Halty (143); the views of 
many authors, both from developed and developing countries, have been gathered by 
Rabinowitch and Rabinowitch (144); the 24th Pugwash Symposium on technology and 
self-reliance (145) has made it clear that the possibility of pursuing alternative 
development strategies is strongly conditioned by scientific and technological 
development; and Herrera (146) has proposed a new synthesis between modern science and 
traditional technology. These authors, among many others, emphasize the renewed 
importance of science and technology for the processes of development and 
underdevelopment. 
The STPI project did not postulate a particular theory on the interrelations 
between science, technology, and industrialization. The review of schools of thought in 
the preceding sections showed that there are alternative perspectives from which to 
examine these interrelations. The relative lack of studies on technical change at the 
firm level in developing countries, as well as the absence of empirical work on the 
process of policy implementation, requires that further knowledge be generated on these 
issues before an adequate transition can be made from a particular theoretical and 
ideological standpoint to the design of policies and the establishment of policy 
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instruments. The research in the STPI project was an attempt to provide partial 
explanatory hypotheses that would begin to fill this gap and provide the'basis for 
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INSTITUTES AND COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING 
IN THE STPI PROJECT 
Secretaria Ejecutiva del Consejo Latinoamericano de 
Ciencias Sociales (CLACSO) 
Country Coordinator: Eduardo Amadeo 
Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos (FINEP) 
Country Coordinator: Fabio Erber (until September 1974) 
and Jose Tavares 
Fondo Colombiano de Investigaciones Cientificas y 
Proyectos Especiales "Francisco Jose de Caldas" 
(COLCIENCIAS) 
Country Coordinator: Fernando Chaparro 
Academy of Scientific Research and Technology 
Country Coordinator: Adel Sabet (until July 1975) and 
Ahmed Gamal Abdel Samie 
National Committee on Science and Technology 
Country Coordinator: Anil Malhotra (until June 1975) 
and S.K. Subramanian (until March 1976) 
The Korea Advanced Institute of Science (KAIS) 
Country Coordinator: KunMo Chung 
El Colegio de Mexico 
Country Coordinator: Alejandro Nadal 
Instituto Nacional de Planificacion (INP) 
Country Coordinator: Enrique Estremadoyro (until 
February 1975) and Fernando Otero 
Technical Directors: Fernando Gonzales Vigil (until 
February 1975) and Roberto Wangeman 
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientificas y 
Tecnologicas (CONICIT) 
Country Coordinator: Dulce de Uzcategui (until July 
1974) and Ignacio Avalos 
Faculty of Economics, University of Skopje 
Country Coordinator: Nikola Kljusev 
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Appendix 2 
SURVEY OF THE COUNTRY TEAM'S WORK 
The organization, composition, and orientation of each of the country teams 
reflected the own interests and those of the institutions that hosted them, always 
within the framework of the STPI project concerns. A brief review of the approach and 
the work of each team may help to place the STPI project and the comparative reports 
in perspective. To complete the survey, a description of the field coordinator's of-
fice work is given. 
ARGENTINA: The initial location for the Argentine team was the Department of Econom-
ics of the Catholic University. However, after some months, the university decided 
to withdraw its application and the country coordinator moved to the Argentine branch 
of the executive secretariat of the Latin American Social Science Council (CLACSO). The 
team was headed by Eduardo Amadeo, an economist, and two other members were appointed 
to work full time on the project. An advisory committee of several researchers and 
policymakers active in science and technology policy was formed. To carry out the re-
search, the team relied on consultants ~1ho wrote reports on specific subjects that V1ere 
integrated into a final report. 
A significant change took place when the country coordinator was named 
president of the Instituto rlacional de Tecnologia Industrial (INTI), the national 
industrial technology institute, which is the largest and most important industrial re-
search organization in Argentina. Mr Amadeo never relinquished his formal role as co-
ordinator; after 6 months, he left his new post and resumed his position as country co-
ordinator. Because most of the work was well under way, his absence did not substan-
tially alter the team's pace, ~lthough the preparation of the Argentine synthesis report 
was postponed. Part of the team's work was reoriented to be most useful to the co-
ordinator in his new position. 
The Argentines focused on two branches of industry machine tools and petro-
chemicals - but studied many broader issues. For instance, the reports include a docu-
ment on the technological content of the 3-year development plan (1974-77), a study of 
the Argentine industrial structure, a description and brief analysis of technology pol-
icy instruments in Argentina, a study of the system for regulating technology imports, 
and several short reports on international technical assistance as an instrument of tech-
nology pol icy. 
The structure of the Argentine scientific and technological system was studied 
in detail, as were the conditions under which it could be made more responsive to 
industry's needs. The Argentines covered the public sector, examining the possible role 
of the public sector as promoter of scientific and technological development. Detailed 
studies were carried out at two enterprises: one in charge of generating electricity 
in Buenos Aires (SEGBA) and the other in charge of generating and distributing gas for 
household and industrial consumption. Other contributions of the Argentine team were 
a study of the emergence and development of engineering and consulting firms in the 
chemical process industries, a detailed analysis of two research centres within the 
national industrial technology institute (INTI), and two short papers on capital accumu-
lation and on the crisis of capitalism. 
The Argentine team followed the methods guidelines; however, they produced a 
series of thematic reports on issues of actual and potential interest to policymakers 
in the country, coinciding with the themes selected for study in STPI. 
BRAZIL: The Brazilian team was hosted at the research group of the Financiadora de 
Estudos e Projetos (FINEP), the state agency in charge of financing studies for invest-
ment projects and also the executive arm of the national fund for scientific and tech-
nological development. The first coordinator was the director of the research group, 
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Fabio Erber. When he took a leave of absence from FINEP in September 1974, he was 
replaced by Jose Tavares, the new head of the research group. The group at FINEP had 
been carrying out research on science and technology policy for some t~me, and the STPI 
assignment was one of its tasks for 1973-76. Practically all of the work was done by 
members of the FINEP research group, although two or three reports were contracted to 
professionals outside FINEP. 
From the beginning, the Brazilians decided to concentrate on the role of state 
enterprises in technology policy. They chose branches of industry that were dominated 
by state enterprises (oil and petrochemicals, steel, and electricity), conducting de-
tailed interviews, analyzing existing data, and testing hypotheses systematically to 
cover issues such as the selection of equipment and processes, the purchase of 
engineering services, the performance of research and development, and the planning 
activities at these state enterprises. 
In addition to the new material generated by the Brazilian team during STPI, 
several reports based on past research carried out by FINEP were made ava i1 able to the 
STPI network. These included background reports on the organization and structure of 
the Brazilian science and technology system, a study on the machine tool industry, a 
report on the demand for services of 12 research institutes, and a background report on 
industrial policies in Brazil during the last 2 decades. 
In parallel v1ith the work for STPI, the FINEP team 1·1as also engaged in a re-
search project on the diffusion of technical innovations in three industrial branches 
(pulp and paper, cement, and textiles) and they agreed to put their results at the 
disposal of the STPI network as an additional contribution. 
The Brazilian team used the guidelines only as a general reference, given that 
most of their work went along different lines from those originally envisaged for the 
project. Nevertheless, the richness and variety of their material effectively upgraded 
the comparative reports. 
COLOMBIA: No Colombian participant was present at the initial organ1z1ng meeting, and 
the Colombian application to join the STPI network was received later and formally 
accepted at the Rio meeting of the coordinating committee. The team was hosted by the 
Colombian Council for Science and Technology, COLCIENCIAS, and was headed by a sociolog-
ist, Fernando Chaparro. In spite of joining the STPI network late, the Colombian team 
caught up with the pace of work and finished all its work by the deadline. 
COLCIENCIAS organized a special team with five members who devoted practically 
all their time to research in STPI. Several other consultants were also asked to pre-
pare reports on issues of specific interest such as selected policy instruments. For 
example, a study was commissioned on the impact of tariff mechanisms; a report was pre-
pared on the influence of price controls; and a preliminary analysis of the possible 
use of the state's purchasing power as an instrument of technology policy was also pre-
pared. The branches chosen for study were all linked to agriculture: fertilizers and 
pesticides, agricultural machinery, and food processing, taking into consideration the 
interests of Colombian policymakers as perceived by the team. In these branch studies, 
the methods guidelines were closely followed. 
Other reports prepared by the Colombian team include a study of science and 
technology planning, an analysis of implicit industrial technology policies, a conceptual 
framework for the study of consulting and engineering organizations, a series of reports 
on industrial branches based on discussions with panels of experts, a study of science 
and technology policies in the agricultural sector (to complement the analysis done for 
industry), and two essays on the process of industrialization in Colombia and its techno-
logical implications. 
Five groups of policy instruments were studied in detail, and their impact on 
each branch was examined through interviews at various enterprises. All of the findings 
were integrated into the final report of the Colombian team. 
EGYPT: Although an Egyptian representative participated in the initial deliberations 
leading to the STPI project, it was not possible to organize the team to carry out 
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research and prepare inputs for the international comparison. There were several admin-
istrative difficulties and staffing problems that prevented the organization of a work-
ing team. The host institution was the Academy of Scientific Research and Technology 
and the first coordinator was Adel Sabet, who was replaced by Gamal A. Samie in July 
1975. The Egyptian team presented papers that were personal contributions based on 
past experience rather than the result of research carried out by a team; and research 
was not begun at the academy until the second half of 1976. 
The host organization in India was the National Committee on Science and Tech-
ogy, and the first coordinator was Anil Malhotra, who was replaced in June 1975 by 
S.K. Subramanian. Mr Subramanian resigned in March 1976, and no one replaced him. No 
funds were requested to set up a country team in India, and the Indians provided back-
ground material that had already been collected as background for a new science and tech-
nology plan. 
Three background documents were distributed along with the final S & T plan to 
all the teams in STPI. In addition, a report on foreign collaboration, a note on 
science and technology planning in India, a survey of engineering consultancy services, 
a report on the development of the electronics industry, and two papers on small scale 
industries and technology transfer were distributed by the Indian coordinator. No em-
pirical research was done following the methods guidelines, and the Indian contribution 
to the comparative reports reflects this. 
SOUTH KOREA: The South Korean team was one of the first to be organized and was esta-
lished at the Korean Advanced Institute of Science, KAIS, as part of the activities of 
its science, technology, and society program. KunMo Chung was named country coordinator 
and the team consisted of five other members. All but one of them had other academic 
duties and could allocate only a portion of their time to STPI research. Then, Graham 
Jones was hired to advise in the preparation of the report for phase 1. 
The South Korean team advanced rapidly and completed its work in time for the 
Sussex workshop, following the methods guidelines and introducing modifications only 
where necessary. Two reports were produced corresponding to the requirements for phases 
1 and 2 of the project. 
The branches chosen for study were electronics, petrochemicals, and powder 
metallurgy, and a report was prepared for each one. In addition, the team prepared 
documents on engineering services and industrialization in South Korea, on the Korean 
Institute of Science and Technology, on transfer of technology in the electronics indus-
try, on the interface between the science and technology plan and the economic develop-
ment plan, and on state enterprises in technical development. 
Although most of the work was done by the team located at KAIS, consultants 
were asked to deal with specifics. The team predominantly represented engineering and 
physical sciences, but an economist who was a senior government official, helped to 
relate the results to South Korean policymakers and to balance the other tea11 members' 
biases. 
The Mexican team was among the first to start working in STPI and was located 
egio de Mexico, an academic and social research and graduate training organiza-
tion. Alejandro Nadal was country coordinator and there were four other members of the 
team who worked full time on STPI. The Mexican team initially followed the guidelines 
rather closely and was one of the first in suggesting modifications and changes as a 
result of contrasting concepts with preliminary research findings. In particular, the 
team found it difficult to interpret the results of interviews in enterprises using the 
schema proposed to study technological behaviour. The branches chosen for detailed 
study were capital goods, food processing, and petrochemicals. 
A background report on the structure and evolution of the Mexican scientific 
and technological system was prepared, together with a description of the industrial-
ization process and of agricultural development. Documents on particular subjects 
included a report on engineering firms, a study of the technology policy of PEMEX (the 
state oil monopoly), and progress reports dealing with hypotheses on the impact of policy 
instruments on technical behaviour at the enterprise level, a description of policy ins-
instruments in Mexico, etc. 
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Most of the findings of the Mexican team were integrated into the main final 
report, part of which was delivered at the coordinating committee in New Delhi {January 
1976) and the rest at the Sussex workshop (June 1976). The work of the Mexican team 
covered practically all the research topics considered in STPI, and its contribution 
to the comparative report reflects this. The Mexican report was published in Spanish 
in 1977 and was awarded second prize in a contest for the best works in economics. 
For various reasons, the Mexican team chose to limit its direct interaction 
with policymakers and followed its own research program. Results were made available 
to policymakers in the form of draft reports, and through the participation of the coor-
dinator in one of the committees established to prepare the Mexican plan for science 
and technology. 
PERU: The Peruvian team was established within the research group of the National 
P'Tai1ning Institute. A series of administrative difficulties affected the progress of 
the team, including a change of technical director, when Fernando Gonzales Vigil was 
replaced by Roberto Wangeman in February 1975. Approximately two-thirds of the research 
was completed in time for the Sussex workshop. 
From the beginning, the team decided to adopt a sectorial approach to the re-
search. Efforts were focused on the study of industrial branches connected with the 
extraction and processing of minerals and with the provision of machinery for the mining 
industry. The steel industry was also studied, with emphasis on the state enterprise 
in charge of the largest steelworks. This meant that the guidelines were used primarily 
in sectorial studies and in the analysis of policy instruments. 
Background reports on the situation of the scientific and technological system 
and on the evolution of Peruvian industry were prepared following the general framework 
put forward in the guidelines. In addition to these and the sectorial reports, the team 
prepared other documents, dealing with issues such as explicit and implicit science and 
technology policies, consulting and engineering capabilities, the possible use of state 
enterprises as instruments of technology policy, and the government administrative ma-
chinery for science and technology policy. 
The Peruvian team was located within an official government organization, but 
its direct impact on policymaking is difficult to assess because it took the form of 
daily contact with government officials. On the basis of the sectorial reports on 
mining, a committee has been set up to review the findings of the STPI team. 
VENEZUELA: The Venezuelan team was hosted by the national council of science and tech-
nology (CONICIT) and was among the first to start working. The team was initially 
dominated by sociologists, although economists increased their participation at later 
stages. The first coordinator, Dulce de Uzcategui, was replaced by Luis Matos, 1vho was 
soon followed by Ignacio Avalos. Three other members worked full time, and the team 
was biased toward sociology and economics. 
They progressed through two stages punctuated by a change in government. In 
the first stage, most of the background reports corresponding to phases 1 and 2 of the 
STPI methods were prepared, covering the science and technology, the political, the 
educational, and the economic systems. These reports were made obsolete by the change 
in government. In the second stage, the team tried to adjust to the new situation, 
repeating some of the earlier studies and continuing the research. However, the orga-
nization of a national congress on science and technology, which mobilized all the 
staff working at CONICIT, affected the team's progress. 
The branches chosen for study were capital goods, electronics, and petrochemi 
cals. In addition, reports were written on specific issues such as the government 
organizational structure for science and technology policy, instruments for industrial 
science and technology policy, economic and financial policy instruments and their im-
pact on technology, the purchase of capital goods in two industrial branches, and the 
relations between the financial system and technology policy. The Venezuelan team 
concluded its research shortly after the Sussex workshop. 
The fact that the Venezuelan team was located in a government agency that took 
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a very active role in science and technology policy after the change in government 
created both opportunities and problems. As a result of the new tasks undertaken by 
CONICIT, the pace and continuity of the STPI work was frequently altered. On the other 
hand, there was more possibility for actively contributing to policymaking. The Vene-
zuelan contribution to the comparative reports reflects this situation. 
YUGOSLAVIA (MACEDONIA): The Macedonian team was organized at the faculty of economics 
of the University of Skopje. A senior faculty member, Nikola Kljusev, was appointed 
coordinator. The team was composed of a very large number of faculty members and re-
searchers who devoted part of their time to STPI. The tasks were subdivided and indi-
vidual reports requested from various members of the team, although at a later stage 
two team members were asked to work full time on STPI. 
The Macedonian team did not follow the guidelines, except in the preparation 
of a background report for phase 1. Individual reports ~1ere submitted on issues of 
interest to the STPI network, covering topics such as the problems of research and 
development in industrial enterprises, aspects of science and technology policy in Yu-
goslavia, the metallurgical industry in Macedonia, and the growth of engineering firms 
in Yugoslavia. 
The Macedonian team's specificity is reflected in their relatively limited 
contribution to the comparative reports. At any rate, given the high degree of partic-
ipation of professionals at all levels in policymaking in the Yugoslav self-managed 
economy, it is rather difficult to assess their contribution toward policymaking in 
conventional terms. 
THE FIELD COORDINATOR'S OFFICE: In August 1973, at the first meeting of the coordi-
nating committee, Francisco Sagasti was appointed field coordinator of the project and 
his office was established shortly thereafter and began operating in a limited way. 
Staffing was completed in April 1974 with the addition of two members. 
The field coordinator's office was independent from the teams and was not 
engaged directly in empirical research. It offered organizational and technical support 
and contracted consultants to prepare reports on topics defined by the coordinating 
committee. 
The field coordinator, first, drew up methods guidelines for phases l and 2 
of the project. Background reports on technology policy in China, on technological 
dependence/self-reliance, on science and technology planning, on technology policies in 
Japan, and on technology transfer were also prepared, either by staff members of the 
field coordinator's office or by consultants. The guidelines for phases 3 and 4 of the 
project were prepared jointly by the field coordinator and a consultant. The office 
also organized the Sussex workshop and drafted the comparative reports. The field coor-
dinator was also active in the board of the Peruvian Industrial Technology Institute 
(ITINTEC). 
With the exception of the teams that were engaged in science and technology 
policy research as part of the activities of their institutions (the Brazilian and 
South Korean teams, for example), the teams were dismantled after the STPI project was 
completed. The field coordinator's office was closed in December 1976, and the compara-
tive reports were prepared during 1977-1978, although some teams had not finished their 
work by April 1978. Even though most teams had concluded their STPI activities by the 
end· of 1977, this does not mean that the team members left the field of S & T policy 
research and that their effort in STPI ~1as not follo~1ed up. What was dismantled, as 
planned from the beginning, was the formal structure of the STPI project. The network 
of personal contacts remains in operation and most of the former team members are active 
in the field of science and technology policy, carrying the experience accumulated in 
STPI to their new positions. 
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